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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
ATTACHMENT-AFFIDAVIT-EFFECT OF DELAY IN PUBLICATION AFTER FILING.

-The Illinois Appellate Court has recently held' that where an affidavit
in attachment 2 is made and filed on the same day and where the writ of
attachment issues on that day, the trial court obtains jurisdiction and
holds it until the judgment is entered, notwithstanding that an interval
of sixty-three days occurred between the issuance of the writ and the statutory publication required in the case of the defendant's nonresidence.8
The court distinguished previous decisions which held that jurisdiction
was lacking Where the affidavit wanted an essential element 4 or where
there was5 an unreasonable interval between the making and filing of the
affidavit.
On February 29, 1936, Berry, the plaintiff, made and filed an affidavit of attachment, and the writ issued the same day. On March 9, the
writ was returned showing a levy on two pieces of property, and eleven
days later, Berry filed an amended complaint. From March 21 to April 4,
I Berry v. Ackerman, 305 Ill. App. 554, 27 N.E. (2d) 551 (1940).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 11, §§ 2 et seq.
s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 11, § 22.
4 Baldwin v. Ferguson, 35 IM. App. 393 (1890).
5 Foster v. Illinski, 3 Il. App. 345 (1879).
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the requisite notice to the nonresident defendant, Ackerman, was given,
and on March 27, the clerk of the superior court filed a certification of the
fact that he had sent a copy of the notice to the defendant at his residence. From May 2 to May 16, for some unexplained reason, the statutory notice by publication was repeated. On June 10, there was judgment,
and six days later a special writ of execution issued. June 22, Berry filed
a suit in chancery in aid of the special writ of execution to set aside certain fraudulent conveyances by the defendant. January 28, 1938, the plaintiff was granted a decree in his chancery action cancelling the fraudulent
conveyances and allowing him to proceed against the property under
his special writ of execution. The property was sold to satisfy the execution. December 1, 1938, the defendant filed a petition in the superior
court to expunge the attachment judgment from the record on the
grounds that the sixty-three day interval between issuing the writ of attachment and the second publication, the first having been abandoned,
was unreasonable and thus caused the court to lose jurisdiction. The petiW. L. SCHLEGEL, JR.
tion was denied for the reasons stated above.
AUTOMOBILES-SALE AND TRANSFER-EFFECT OF FAITLuRE TO TRANSFm CER-

TIFICATE OF TrTLE TO CAR IIm VIOLAFION OF UNIFORM ANTI-THEFT ACT ON REPosSESSION RiGHT OF CONDITIONAL VENDOR.-Hunt, a retail dealer in new and

used automobiles, purchased, under a conditional sales contract, a second-hand car from the plaintiff, who retained the certificate of title in violation of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Anti-theft Act.1 Hunt made a conditional sale of the machine in the usual course of his business to Emma
Weiss and on the same day sold the Weiss contract and note to the defendant finance company. At this time and thereafter the certificate of
title remained in the hands of the plaintiff. Then the defendant took possession of the car under the terms of the second conditional sale contract because of a default on the Weiss obligation. Some time later, the
plaintiff sued the defendant in replevin, alleging that he had title to the
car and was now entitled to possession under the terms of the original
agreement with Hunt. It was held by the Illinois Appellate Court in L. B.
2
Motors, Inc. v. Prichard,
that the plaintiff was estopped to assert his title
against the defendant because the car had been placed in the hands of a
dealer and thus an indicia of ownership in the latter had been created
which the plaintiff could not deny, despite the fact that each vendee had
failed to get a certificate of title as required by the Anti-theft Act.
The court seemed to assume, without expressly deciding, that the defendant's interest was derived through Emma Weiss, the second conditional vendee of the machine. This is difficult to believe. What the defendant bought was Hunt's rights against the latter's vendee and against
the rest of the world. In other words, the defendant was an assignee of a
chose in action and not a purchaser of the chattel. And when he took
possession of the car because of the default under the contract which
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95%, § 74 et seq.
2

303 Ill. App. 318, 25 N.E. (2d) 129 (1940).
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Hunt had assigned to him, he did not become a purchaser. He merely asserted certain of his rights in regard to the chattel and remained an assignee of the dealer as to the rest of his interest.
If the defendant was an assignee, the Anti-theft Act has nothing to do
with the case. The act does not contemplate that a party whose interest
in an automobile arises as did this defendant's shall receive or even examine the certificate of title. If there had been strict compliance with the
statute, the certificate would have been transferred along with the machine to the first vendee, Hunt, and thence to the second vendee, Emma
Wiess. The defendant would not, except by chance, have seen the instrument. Therefore, his failure to see it in this case was not such as to put
him on notice that the dealer's title or authority to sell might be questionable. Thus the act does not affect the rights of the defendant, if this view
of the case be correct, and his position must be examined in the light of
precedent. The general rule, of course, is that an assignee takes nothing
but the interest of his assignor; 3 however, estoppel may operate to create
an exception. The case of Greeley County v. First National Bank of
Cozad4 is an excellent example. There a creditor sold and assigned his
claim against a county. The purchaser requested his assignor to file the
claim with the county clerk in the assignor's name but on behalf of the
assignee. This was done, and the assignor was enabled to secure a certified copy of the claim in his own name and made a fraudulent second
assignment to one who relied on the certified copy and who notified the
county of his rights before the original assignee did. The court in holding that the second purchaser of the claim had the superior right to payment, stated, as one ground 5 of its decision, that the first buyer was
estopped by his conduct to deny the validity of the second assignment,
despite the fact that there had been nothing left to assign.
To what extent is a party estopped to assert his rights
as against persons who have dealt with a dealer in whom he has vested possession of
a chattel and thus "apparent authority" to transfer the same? A purchaser of the chattel in the regular course of business is protected. 6 Mortgagees and pledgees of the property, on the other hand, have been denied
protection on the grounds that apparent authority to sell is not apparent
authority to encumber.7 Thus a tendency toward limitation of the doctrine to sales in the ordinary course of business can be noted. It would
seem, therefore, that the act of the plaintiff in the instant case of placing
3 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed., 1936), II, 1243 et seq., § 432.

126 Neb. 872, 254 N.W. 502 (1934).
5 The other ground was that a second assignee in good faith who first notifies
the debtor of his claim has a superior right to a prior assignee.
6 Illinois Bond and Investment Co. v. Gardner, 249 Ill. App. 337 (1928).
7 National Guarantee & Finance Co. v. Pfaff Motor Car Co., 124 Ohio St. 34,
176 N.E. 678 (1931); Pacific Finance Corporation v. Hendley, 119 Cal.-App. 697, 7
P. (2d) 391 (1932), interpreting the local statute. But see Bauer v. Commercial
Credit Co., 163 Wash. 210, 300 P. 1049 (1931), where a mortgagee was protected,
seemingly because of the indignation of the court at the plaintiff's scheme to
defraud the public by placing a used car in the hands of the dealer to sell as a
new one.
4
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the car in the hands of a dealer was not such as to estop him from asserting his interest against the assignee of the dealer's conditional sale con8
tract with a third party, and it has been so held.
Assuming for the moment, as did the court, that the interest of the defendant in the principal case was derived through, and identical with, that
of a purchaser of the car in the regular course of the dealer's business,
the effect of the Anti-theft Act is definitely raised. The statute requires
that each vendor of a motor vehicle have and assign a certificate of title
to his vendee who is required to send it to the Secretary of State and
make application for a new one. 9 If the vendee is a dealer he may keep
the certificate and transfer it to his customer, who must send it to the
10
Secretary of State with an application for a new one. It is criminal for
a seller to fail to transfer the certificate or for the buyer to operate or
permit the operation of the car without taking the required action. It
would seem, then, that when the purchaser from the dealer in the principal case bought the car, she should have known that the dealer committed a crime in not transferring a certificate of title. This should have put
her upon inquiry as to possible defects in the dealer's authority and thus
the doctrine of estoppel should not operate in her favor to bar the rights of
1
the original owner of the car. To hold otherwise, as in Mason v. Shelton,
an abstract decision of the Illinois Appellate Court, is to destroy the effect of the certificate. It might be argued that the act is criminal in nature and that it should be enforced by prosecution and not by penalizing
purchasers, but this contention overlooks the fact that one purpose of the
12
act was to provide for certificates of title. Furthermore, the fact that a
8 Iowa Guarantee Mortgage Corp. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 62 S.D.
18, 250 N.W. 669 (1933).
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95 , § 80: "(a) The owner of a motor vehicle for
which a certificate of title is required hereunder shall not, after January 1, 1934,
sell or transfer his title or interest in or to such motor vehicle unless he shall
have obtained a Certificate of Title thereto nor unless having procured a Certificate of Title he shall in every respect comply with the requirements of this
section and any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished as provided in
... this Act.
"(b) The owner who sells or transfers his title or interest in or to such motor
vehicle after January 1, 1934, shall endorse an assignment and warranty of
title upon the Certificate of Title for such motor vehicle with a statement of all
interests, liens or encumbrances thereon and the owner shall deliver the Certificate of Title to the purchaser or transferee at the time of delivering the
motor vehicle."
10 Il. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95 , § 80 (d): "When the transferee of a motor
vehicle is a dealer who holds the same for resale and operates the same only
for purposes of demonstration under dealer's number plates, or when the transferee does not drive such motor vehicle nor permit such motor vehicle to be
driven upon the highways, such transferee shall not be required to forward the
Certificate of Title to the Secretary of State as provided in the preceding paragraph, but such transferee upon transferring his title or interest to another person
shall execute an assignment and warranty of title upon the Certificate of Title
and deliver the same to the person to whom such transfer is made."
11 292 m. App. 640, 11 N.E. (2d) 224 (1937).
12 The statement of purposes of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-theft Act
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man may be convicted for a crime should not destroy the effect of the
criminal act as notice to one relying upon an "apparent authority" that
such authority may not exist.
This is not to say that a conditional vendor would never be estopped
from asserting his title against a dealer's customer who received no certificate. A statement made to the customer that no interest had been reserved would undoubtedly estop the conditional seller to assert his title
later, as would any other act which would justify the purchaser in ignoring the dealer's failure to transfer the instrument. 13 In this connection, it
might be noted that it has been held that an estoppel to raise a noncompliance with the act in this regard, where transfer of the certificate was
seemingly a condition precedent to a contractual right, resulted from a
representation by the obligor's agent that the transfer would not be required. 14
Furthermore, the effect of the nontransfer of the certificate as notice
to a purchaser that there may be a defect in the title should not be confused with the problem of whether or not transfer of the certificate is essential to the passing of ownership. That question was answered in the
negative in the case of Green v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Company,' 5
where the company contended that there was no liability under a policy
requiring that the insurer be the "unconditional and sole owner of the
car." The court held that the plaintiff was the owner of the car within the
meaning of the contract, and could recover, although the certificate was
still in the hands of the former owner.
It would seem then that the principal case was wrongly decided. If
the defendant be regarded as a claimant through a purchaser from a
dealer in the regular course of business, the purchaser in this case would
have taken notice of the possible defect in the dealer's authority from
the latter's failure to transfer the certificate of title. If the defendant was
an assignee, as has been submitted, he was not such a party as is generally protected by the "apparent authority" doctrine.
W. L. SCHLEGEL, JR.

COURTs-LIMiTED AND INFERIOR JURISDICTION-SCOPE OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF COUNTY CouRT.-The case of People v. Dickelman' was a prosecution for violation of the Blue Sky Law, 2 initiated by way of a criminal
reads as follows: ". . . to require certificates of title for registered motor
vehicles; to facilitate the recovery of stolen or unlawfully taken motor vehicles.
" The semicolon between the purposes indicates that each is independent
While these purposes were not incorporated into the Illinois act, it is certain
that they were borne in mind by the legislature which adopted the Uniform Act.
13 Westerman v. Corder, 86 Kan. 239, 119 P. 868, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 500 (1912);
Graham v. Thompson, 55 Ark. 296, 18 S.W. 58 (1892); Evans v. Forstall &
Jumonville, 58 Miss. 30 (1880); Palmer v. Welch, 171 Mo. App. 580, 154 S.W.
433 (1913).
14 Burton v. Doss, 285 111. App. 600, 3 N.E. (2d) 168 (1936).
15 61 N.D. 376, 237 N.W. 794 (1931).
1 304 Ill. App. 482, 26 N.E. (2d).704 (1940).
2 Illinois Securities Law; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 121%, §§ 102a (2,3), 101b, 104.
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information in the County Court of Cook County. The defendants were tried
before a jury, found guilty, and ordered to pay a fine in addition to serving a sentence in the county jail. They then prosecuted an appeal to the
Appellate Court of Illinois, contending that the County Court of Cook
County had no criminal jurisdiction,3 and that, therefore, their conviction was erroneous.
An act,4 dating back to 1874, gave to the Criminal Court of Cook
County exclusive jurisdiction of all criminal offenses. The defendants insisted that this act necessarily repealed by implication (at least as to
Cook County) an act of 18715 giving to the county courts concurrent jurisdiction of those cases involving crimes or misdemeanors in which the
punishment is neither imprisonment in the penitentiary nor death. In affirming the conviction, the Appellate Court held that repeal by implication had not occurred and that the jurisdiction of the two courts was concurrent, subject to the limitations imposed on the county court by the
statute.
The county courts of Illinois were first organized under the authority
of the Constitution of 18486 and endowed with a limited criminal and civil
jurisdiction. 7 The Constitution of 1870 perpetuated the county court as a
part of the judicial system s and in addition to a specified grant of enumerated powers (not including criminal jurisdiction) the legislature was authorized to provide such other jurisdiction as they might desire through
regular enactment. 9 Thereafter, in 1872, the General Assembly increased
the criminal jurisdiction of the county courts in counties of less than
100,000 population to include exclusive cognizance of criminal offense and
misdemeanors where the punishment was neither imprisonment in the
penitentiary nor death.' 0 This act was immediately attacked in the case
of Myers v. People" (an appeal from a conviction for a liquor violation
in the County Court of Bureau County) as unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court, in affirming the conviction, held that the section restricting the
operation of the act to counties having less than 100,000 population would
exclude Cook County and was therefore unconstitutional as violative of
the requirement 'that all laws relating to courts shall be general and of
uniform operation, 12 but that the remaining six sections of the act were
valid, since they were independent of each other and complete in their
3 Other allegations of error, herein unimportant, were offered and denied by
the court.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 701.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 37, § 177.
6 Ill. Const. 1848, Art. 5, § 16. There were, however, Courts of County Commissioners which originated in 1819 (1829 ?), that were presided over by the
County Commissioners. These were courts of record and had jurisdiction in
the counties over matters of revenue, licenses, roads, and bridges, but no
criminal jurisdiction. Rev. Laws 1829, p. 33, Rev. Laws 1833, p. 142.
7 Ill. Const. 1848, Art. 5, § 18.
8 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 6, § 1.
9 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 6, § 18.
1O Session Laws 1871-72, p. 325, §§ 1-7 inclusive.
11 67 Ill. 503 (1873).
12 IR. Const. 1870, Art. 6, § 29; applied in Kingsbury v. Sperry, 119 InI. 279, 10
N.E. 8 (1887); Dawson v. Eustice, 148 Ill. 346, 36 N.E. 87 (1894); People v.
Hibernian Banking Ass'n, 245 Il. 522, 92 N.E. 305 (1910).
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several component parts. The court, however, intimated that "exclusive
jurisdiction" as provided in the act, would be construed as "concurrent
13
jurisdiction." Shortly afterwards, in the case of Mapes v. The People,
the provision for exclusive jurisdiction was declared to be an attempt to
destroy the constitutional jurisdiction of the circuit courts, 14 but it was
held that the county courts might entertain concurrent jurisdiction within
the bonds imposed by the act.
These two attacks caused the legislature, in 1877, by revision to purge
the County Court Act of 1872 of its errors. In the third section, the words
"concurrent jurisdiction" were substituted for "exclusive jurisdiction,"
and the restriction as to operation in counties of less than 100,000 population was omitted entirely. 15 Since this revision, up to the instant case,
there has been but one other case before the Supreme Court involving an
appeal from a county court conviction for violation of the Blue Sky Law.
6
In that case, no question was raised as to jurisdiction.' Limitations,
prosecution
the
for
initiating
however, have been placed on the methods
17
by the Illinois Appellate Court.
The present Criminal Court of Cook County was originally the Recorder's Court of the City of Chicago.' 8 By virtue of a constitutional provision in 1870, the court obtained its present name and unique position as
the only court in the state whose jurisdiction is limited to the trial of criminal offenses. 19 While the Constitution did not expressly confer upon it
exclusive jurisdiction of criminal offenses, including misdemeanors, nor
expressly authorize the legislature to confer any increased jurisdiction
on this court (as was the case regarding the county courts) there was enacted in 1874 that section of the criminal code 20 conferring an exclusive
jurisdiction on the criminal court. This act was attacked in the case of
Berkowitz v. Lester 2 ' on the ground that it invaded the constitutiona]
jurisdiction conferred upon the circuit courts. It was there held that this
court possessed no more than concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit
court.
For more than sixty years these two jursidictional statutes have remained side by side without question, though the language of each has
posed as being inconsistent with that of the other. The instant case
brought the ambiguity to light and settled it by requiring that both statutes
be read together, neither one obliterating the other. It thus appears that
criminal prosecutions in Cook County, involving offenses in which the punishment is neither imprisonment in the penitentiary nor death, may orig14 Ill.Const. 1870, Art. 6, § 12.
i3 69 Ill.
523 (1873).
15 Session Laws 1877, p. 77.
16 People v. Love, 310 Ill. 558, 142 N.E. 204 (1924).
17 People v. Harshbarger, 296 Ill. App. 397, 16 N.E. (2d) 247 (1938). See 5 Ill.
Law Rev. 108-15.
19 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 6, § 26.
18 Ill. Session Laws 1853, p. 147.
20 III. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 701. All laws of the 29th General Assembly
not found in the Session Laws of 1873 are incorporated in the Ill. Rev. Stat. of
1874 and are not to be found elsewhere. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 348, Div. 10, § 2.
21 121 II. 99, 11 N.E. 860 (1887).
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inate in either the criminal court or the county court. The Appellate Court
proceeded upon the theory that the various sessions of the legislature between 1871 and 1874, even though separately organized as the 27th and the
28th General Assemblies, were in effect but one continuous session in
the sense that their purpose was to put the State on a working basis in
conformity with the then new constitution. 22 Since those sessions were
treated as one, the fundamental rule for statutory interpretation that acts
of the same session are to be read together and neither is to be considered
to repeal the other by implication 2 is here properly applied.
L.
DEATH-SuRviVAL

OF

RIGHT

or

ACTION

OF

PERSON

LE=ER

INJURED--WHETHER

ADMINISTRATOR CAN RECOVER FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND ALSO FOR DAMAGE TO
THE ESTATE BEFORE THE DEATH-The question presented in the recent case

of Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber Company' is whether an administrator of a person who has been injured by the alleged negligence of
another and who has died as a direct and proximate result of such
injury, can maintain two suits as administrator, one on behalf of the
next of kin to recover damages occasioned by the wrongful death and
another for damages alleged to have been caused the estate prior to
his death.

In those states which, like Illinois, have a death act modeled after
Lord Campbell's Act 2 and also a survival statute,8 the question as to the
number of actions arising from the wrongful death is one that has
given the courts considerable trouble. 4 Essentially the problem is one of
interpretation and construction, and whether these two acts were passed
simultaneously or at different times seems to have made no difference.
Some courts have said that the result of these statutes is to permit
the personal representative to recover all the damages, both to the
decedent by reason of the injury and to the beneficiaries by reason
of the death, in one action and not to require him to elect between
the two rights of action and to sue upon one only.5 However, the KenPreface, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1874.
Hoyne v. Danisch, 264 Ill. 467, 106 N.E. 341 (1914); People v. Fox, 269 Ill. 300,
110 N.E. 26 (1915).
1 305 Ill. App. 473, 27 N.E. (2d) 285 (1940).
22
23

2

9 & 10 Vict. c. 93. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 70, § 1 (Jones Ill. Stats. Ann.

§ 38.01).
3 IM. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 125 (Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. § 110.125).
4 The cases are collected and annotated in: 34 L.R.A. 788; 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 384;
L.R.A. 1915 E 1095, 1104. See also 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 993; 44 Harv. L. Rev. 980;
59 Am. L. Rev. 239; 4 Ill. L. Rev. 425.
5 Kling v. Torello, 87 Conn. 301, 87 A. 987, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 930 (1913); Mobile,
Jackson and Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Hicks, 91 Miss. 273, 46 So. 360, 124 Am. St.
Rep. 679 (1908); Pickens v. Illinois Central R. Co., 92 Miss. 210, 45 So. 868 (1908);
Murray v. Omaha Transfer Co., 95 Neb. 175, 145 N.W. 360 (1914), 98 Neb. 482,
153 N.W. 488 (1915); McClaugherty v. Rogue River Electric Co., 73 Ore. 135,
140 P. 64 (1914), 144 P. 569 (1914); Hawkins v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 202 F.

340 (1913).
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tucky court has held that under the statutes of that state the personal representative must elect whether he will sue upon the common law action which accrued to the decedent and survived or upon
the cause of action arising under the statute; he cannot do both.0
In a few states the death statute is held to apply only to cases of
instantaneous or immediate death and the survival statute only to
cases where the death was not instantaneous or immediate. 7 Under
some statutes a pending suit for personal injuries may be continued
by the statutory beneficiaries without revival, provided death resulted
from the injury for which the suit was brought, but not otherwise. 8
Whereas, under other statutes, where the decedent brought suit for his
injuries and died during the pendency thereof, the action must be
continued by his personal representative under the survival statute,
and it is only where no such suit was brought that the statutory action for death will lie.9 Particular statutes provide that actions for
personal injury shall not survive and that in case of death the only
action which can be brought is the statutory action for wrongful death.' 0
Rhode Island, Kansas, Missouri, and Texas, in construing the two
statutes together, have held that the statute giving a right of action
for death by wrongful act limits the operation of the survival statute
6 Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Banks' Adm'r, 142 Ky. 746, 135 S.W. 285 (1911);
Bowling Green Gaslight Co. v. Dean's Ex'x, 142 Ky. 678, 134 S.W. 1115 (1911);
Randolph's Adm'r v. Snyder, 139 Ky. 159, 129 S.W. 562 (1910); Louisville Ry. Co.
v. Raymond's Adm'r, 135 Ky. 738, 123 S.W. 281, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 176 (1909);

Hendricks v. American Express Co., 138 Ky. 704, 128 S.W. 1089, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.)
867 (1910); Thomas's Adm'r v. Maysville Gas Co., 108 Ky. 224, 56 S.W. 153, 53
L.R.A. 147 (1900).
7 Hammond v. Lewiston, A. & W. St. R. Co., 106 Me. 209, 76 A. 672, 30 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 78 (1909); Anderson v. Wetter, 103 Me. 257, 69 A. 105, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1003 (1908); Carrigan v. Stillwell, 97 Me. 247, 54 A. 389, 61 L.R.A. 163 (1903);
Conley v. Portland Gaslight Co., 96 Me. 281, 52 A. 656 (1902); Sawyer v. Perry,
88 Me. 42, 33 A. 660 (1895); Beach v. City of St. Joseph, 192 Mich. 296, 158 N.W.
1045 (1916); Wood v. Standard Drug Store, 190 Mich. 654, 157 N.W. 403 (1916);
Olivier v. Houghton County St. Ry. Co., 134 Mich. 367, 96 N.W. 434, 3 Ann. Cas.
53 (1903); Storrie v. Grand Trunk Elevator Co., 134 Mich. 297, 96 N.W. 569 (1903);
Kyes v. Valley Tel. Co., 132 Mich. 281, 93 N.W. 623 (1903); Jones v. McMillan,
129 Mich. 86, 88 N.W. 206 (1901); Dolson v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 128
Mich. 444, 87 N.W. 629 (1901); Sweetland v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co., 117 Mich.
329, 75 N.W. 1066, 43 L. R.A. 568 (1898); Ford v. Maney's Estate, 251 Mich. 461,

232 N.W. 393, 70 A.L.R. 1315 (1930).
s Daniel v. East Tennessee Coal Co., 105 Tenn. 470, 58 S.W. 859 (1900).

9 Parvis v. Philadelphia, W. & B R. Co., 13 Del. 436, 17 A. 702 (1889); Smith
v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 232 Pa. 456, 81 A. 554 (1911); Black v. Baltimore & 0.
Ry. Co., 224 Pa. 519, 73 A. 903 (1909); Edwards v. Gimbel, 202 Pa. 30, 51 A. 357
(1902); McCafferty v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 193 Pa. St. 339, 44 A. 435, 74 Am. St.
Rep. 690 (1899); Hill v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 178 Pa. St. 223, 35 A. 997, 56 Am.

St. Rep. 754, 35 L.R.A. 196 (1896); Birch v. Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 165
Pa. St. 339, 30 A. 826 (1895).
10 Webber v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 97 F. 140 (1899); Anderson v. Fielding,
92 Minn. 42, 99 N.W. 357, 104 Am. St. Rep. 665 (1904); Cooper v. St. Paul City Ry.
Co., 55 Minn. 134, 56 N.W. 588 (1893); Hilliker v. Citizens St. R. Co., 152 Ind. 86,
52 N.E. 607 (1899); Boor v. Lawney, 103 Ind. 468, 3 N.E. 151, 53 Am. Rep. 519
(1885).
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to cases where death does not result from the particular injury which
is the subject of the suit; that where death results from such injury the cause of action does not survive but that the new statutory
action for death arises for the benefit of the designated persons.1 1
This is the interpretation originally given to these statutes by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Holton v. Daly12 and has been followed
since.1 3 In that case the court said, "It is not to be presumed
it was intended there should be two causes of action, in distinct
and different rights, by the same party plaintiff, for the same wrongful act, neglect or default. It would, obviously, be impossible to draw
a line severing with accuracy the damages resulting from the permanent character of the injury and its effect upon the capacity of
the plaintiff for future usefulness in acquiring property, etc., from
the actual loss to the wife, parent, or child, in consequence of being deprived of this same capacity, by reason of the same injury
resulting in death." It is further argued that if the right in the
deceased to have controlled the action during his lifetime is recognized, as it must be, and that his contributory negligence, release,
recovery or defeat is a bar to a recovery by his representative after
his death then it cannot logically follow that the right of action given
by the "Death Statute" is for something other and different from that
right which the deceased possessed.
However, these arguments seem to carry little weight in jurisdictions other than those mentioned. In many jurisdictions, however,
there may be two recoveries where death ensues as a result of a
11 McLaughlin v. Hebron Mfg. Co., 171 F. 269 (1909); Lubrano v. Atlantic
Mills, 19 R.I. 129, 32 A. 205, 34 L.R.A. 797 (1895); Hulbert v. City of Topeka, 34
F. 510 (1888); Berner v. Whittelsey Mercantile Co., 93 Kan. 769, 145 P. 567, Ann.
Cas. 1916 D, 350 (1915); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bennet. 58 Kan. 499, 49 P. 606
(1897); Martin v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 58 Kan. 475, 49 P. 605 (1897); McCarthy
V. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 18 Kan. 46, 26 Am. Rep. 742 (1877);
Downs v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 184 S.W. 995 (Mo., 1916); Greer v. St.
Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 173 Mo. App. 276, 158 S.W. 740 (1913); Showen v.
Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 164 Mo. App. 41, 148 S.W. 135 (1912); Gulf, C. & S. F.
Ry. Co. v. Sullivan, 190 S.W. 739 (Mo., 1916); International & G. N. R. Co., v.
Ellyson, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 45, 94 S.W. 910 (1906); Ellyson v. International & G. N.
R. Co., 33 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 75 S.W. 868 (1903).
131 (1883).
12 106 Ill.
13 Chicago & E. I. R. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 119 Ill. 586, 9 N.E. 263 (1886); Crane
v. Chicago & W. I. R. R. Co., 233 Ill. 259, 84 N.E. 220 (1908); Savage v. Chicago &
Joliet Ry. Co., 238 Ill. 392; 87 N.E. 377 (1909); Mooney v. City of Chicago, 239
Ill. 414, 88 N.E. 194 (1909); Devine v. Healy, 241 Ill. 34, 89 N.E. 251 (1909); Prouty
v. City of Chicago, 250 Ill. 222, 95 N.E. 147 (1911); Ohnesorge v. Chicago City
Ry. Co., 259 Ill. 424, 102 N.E. 819 (1913); Wilcox v. International Harvester Co.,
278 I. 465, 116 N.E. 151 (1917); Pease v. Rockford City Traction Co., 279 Iln. 513,
117 N.E. 83 (1917); Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928); Little v.
Blue Goose Motor Coach Co., 346 Ill. 266, 178 N.E. 496 (1931); Young v. Ostrander,
270 Ill. App. 368 (1933); Harkin v. Ferro Concrete Const. Co., 185 Ill. App. 239
(1914) Krakowski v. Aurora, E. & C. R. Co., 167 Ill. App. 469 (1912); Wetherell
v. Chicago City R.R. Co., 104 Ill. App. 357 (1902); Merrihew v. Chicago City Ry.
Co., 92 Ill. App. 346 (1900).
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wrongful act, one to recover for the conscious suffering, pain,
and anguish suffered by the injured party besides his pecuniary loss,
as well as medical, hospital, and funeral expenses. This action is
brought by the personal representative of the deceased and for the
benefit of the estate. The other may be brought by the personal representative or the next of kin and is to recover the pecuniary loss
which the next of kin sustained by reason of the wrongful death of
the injured party. In some states these two causes of action may
be joined as separate counts in the same suit. The interpretation
given is that the action for wrongful death begins where the other
action ends and that it is not a double recovery for a single wrong14
ful act but separate and distinct recoveries for a double wrong.
15
the
In Brown v. Chicago and North Western Railway Company,
Wisconsin court said that the survival and wrongful death statutes of
Wisconsin and Illinois were similar and then in commenting on the
arguments advanced by the Illinois Supreme Court in Holton v.
Daly,16 said, "The fallacy of that reasoning is easily apparent. True,
in the circumstances named, there is but one wrongful act, but that
is not the sole ground of action in the right of the deceased or the
survivor. It takes the wrongful act and the loss to make the complete cause of action, and as the loss to the person upon whom the
injury is inflicted must be recovered by or in his right, and the
loss to the surviving relatives by or in their right, the causes of action are clearly distinct. It does not require, apparently, much clearness of mental perception to discover that if several persons are
made to suffer pecuniary loss by one wrongful act, each may very
properly have his independent cause of action and remedy for the
loss resulting to him, and that, generally, in order to do complete
justice, in the absence of some provision for a recovery for the benefit of all and a distribution of the proceeds, separate causes of action must necessarily exist."
It was this latter argument which was urged upon the Appellate
14 Murphy v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 92 Ark. 159, 122 S.W. 636 (1909);
Augusta Ry. Co. v. Glover, 92 Ga. 132, 18 S.E. 406 (1893); Jacobs v. Glucose Sugar
Refining Co., 140 F. 766 (1905); Eichorn v. New Orleans & C. R., Light & Power
Co., 112 La. 236, 36 So. 335, 104 Am. St. Rep. 437 (1904); Dronenburg v. Harris,
108 Md. 597, 71 A. 81 (1908); Clare v. New York & N.E. R. Co., 172 Mass. 211, 51
N.E. 1083 (1898); Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Phillips, 64 Miss. 693, 2 So. 537
(1887); Soden v. Trenton & Mercer County Traction Corp., 101 N.J.L. 393, 127
A. 558 (1925); Storrs v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 132 N.Y.S. 954 (1911); Mahoning
Valley Ry. Co. v. Van Alstine, 77 Ohio St. 395, 83 N.E. 601, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 893
(1908); St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Goode, 42 Okla. 784, 142 P. 1185, L.R.A. 1915
E, 1141 (1914); Putman v. Southern Pac. Co., 21 Ore. 230, 27 P. 1033 (1891);
Grainger v. Greenville, S. & A. Ry. Co., 101 S.C. 399, 85 S.E. 968 (1915); Rowe v.
Richards, 35 S.D. 201, 151 N.W. 1001, L.R.A. 1915 E, 1075, Ann. Cas. 1918 A
294 (1915); Westcott v. Central Vermont R. Co., 61 Vt. 438, 17 A. 745 (1889);
Swanson v. Pacific Shipping Co., 60 Wash. 87, 110 P. 795 (1910); Moyer v. City of
Oshkosh, 151 Wis. 586, 139 N.W. 378 (1913).
15 102 Wis. 137, 77 N.W. 748, 44 L.R.A. 579 (1898).
16 Holton v. Daly, 106 Ill. 131 (1883).
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Court in the instant case and apparently favored by it but the court
went on to say that it was not up to this court to overrule the earlier
E. R. BERNSTEIN
holdings of the Illinois courts.
EXECUTORS

AND

ADMINISTRATORS -

PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATORS -

WHETHER

COURT MAY VACATE APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR FOR NONRESIDENT WHO

DIED IN ILLINOIS LEAVING No PROPERTY AT TIME OF APPOINTMENT - The
public administrator of Stephenson County, Illinois, procured letters
of administration upon the estate of P. L. Brady, a resident of Missouri, who had been killed in an auto accident in that county. On
the same day that the letters were granted, three actions ex delicto
were filed against that administrator by the executrix of the driver
of the car that had collided with the one that Brady was driving,
and by two occupants of that car; and judgments were subsequently
rendered for the plaintiffs in those actions. Brady had neither heirs
nor creditors in this state and left no property here. Thelma Brady,
one of deceased's two heirs, and administratrix of deceased's Missouri
estate, filed a petition to revoke the letters granted to the public
administrator.'
The Illinois Appellate Court was called upon to decide whether
the letters of a public administrator who had been appointed to administer the estate of a nonresident decedent could be revoked at
the petition of decedent's heirs where there was no property of the
decedent in the state and no debts owed by him, but where there
was a claim against the decedent for a tort committed in this state.
Construing the section of the recently repealed Administration of
Estates Act which provided that "in all cases where the intestate is a
nonresident,

. . . administration

shall

be granted

to the public

ad-

ministrator," 2 the court decided that the words of the statute were

not mandatory where there was no necessity
on the facts of this case the heir was entitled
ment of the public administrator by direct
It had previously been held in this state

for probate and that
to attack the appointproceedings.3
that administration is

1 In re Estate of Brady, 303 Ill. App. 139, 24 N.E. (2d) 748 (1940).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 3, § 18.
3 The only asset listed in the petition for letters was an insurance policy: It
was not stated what kind or where the insurer was located, but the policy itself
was not in Illinois. Sec. 95 of the Probate Act which became effective Jan. 1, 1940
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 247), states that "when a person dies intestate,
letters of administration shall be issued upon petition therefor unless the court
is satisfied that no tax will be due to the United States or to the State of Illinois
by reason of the death of the decedent and unless the court finds that (1) all
claims are paid (2) all heirs are residents of this State and are all of legal age
and (3) the persons in interest desire to settle the estate without administration."
The requirement, that all heirs must be residents of Illinois to make the appointment of an administrator unnecessary under the new statute, implies that, when
some or all of the heirs are non-residents of Illinois, the appointment of an administrator is necessary. Thus Illinois courts will be called upon to determine
whether the implication mentioned is irresistible in all cases.
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not mandatory and that where no debts were owed by the decedent,
or to him, and conservation of the estate was not essential, the intervention of the administrator to distribute the personal estate is unnecessary. 4 In granting the petition for revocation of letters in this
case, however, the court is forced to go farther than the cases referred to, for here the administrator had already been appointed, and,
further, tort actions had been successfully pressed to a conclusion
against him. The ruling of the court is indicative of two principles:
first, that the existence of a possible cause of action against a decedent does not justify the appointment of an administrator where
said decedent owns no property in this state, and second, that where
a court has, nevertheless, appointed an administrator merely for the
purpose of defending such an action, the appointment can be revoked by a petition for that purpose brought by persons interested
5
in the estate of the decedent wherever said estate is situated.
Had the public administrator listed in his petition for letters of
administration a cause of action for wrongful death as the sole asset
of the estate, and had the opponents in said action Ultimately secured a judgment on a cross-complaint, or after filing a complaint in
their own behalf before the administrator had taken action, the petition for revocation of letters would, more probably than not, be unsuccessful. The right of the public administrator to letters of administration in an estate which has no asset except a cause of action for wrongful death has never been squarely decided by any appellate tribunal in Illinois, but courts of other states have consistently
held that an action for wrongful death is an asset justifying the
appointment of an administrator. 6 To permit the correctness of such
an appointment to depend upon the successful prosecution of the action
by the public administrator would be an absurd, yet necessary, road
to the conclusion that the issuance of the letters was erroneous because
H. P. COHEN
of the opponents' victory.
JUDGMENT--TIME FOR REDITIoN-LONG

DELAY AS AFFECTING JURISDIC-

TION IN RENDERING JUDGMENT-In Wallace Grain and Supply Company
4 Riley v. Loughrey, Adm'r, 22 Ill. 98 (1859); Cotterell v. Coen, 246 IM. 410, 92
N.E. 911 (1910).
5 In the case of In re Estate of Trost, 292 Ill. App. 60, 10 N.E. (2d) 857 '(1937),
the court refused to vacate the appointment of the public administrator on the
ground that the party seeking his removal was not interested in the estate.
6 Southern Pacific Co. v. De Valle Da Costa, 190 F. 689 (1911); American Car
& Foundry Co. v. Anderson, 211 Fed. 301 (1914); Washington Asphalt Block and
Tile Co. v. Mackey, 15 App. D.C. 410 (1899); Ex parte Jenkins, 25 Ind. App. 532,
58 N.E. 560, 81 Am. St. Rep. 114 (1900); Morris, Adm'r v. Chicago R. I. & P. R.
Co., 65 Iowa 727, 23 N.W. 143, 54 Am. Rep. 39 (1885); Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Lewis, 24 Neb. 848, 40 N. W. 401, 2 L.R.A. 67 (1888); Fann v. North Carolina R.
Co., 155 N.C. 136, 71 S.E. 81 (1911); In re Mayo's Estate, 60 S.C. 401, 38 S.E.
634 (1901); Rivera v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 149 S.W. 223 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1912); Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Beezley, 153 S.W. 651 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1913); Fickeisen v. Wheeling Electrical Co., 67 W.Va. 335, 67 S.E. 788 (1910).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW

REVIEW

v. Cary,' the question as to whether mere delay in rendering judgment
will cause the court to lose jurisdiction, was presented for the first
time to the Supreme Court of this state. The plaintiff obtained a favorable verdict in 1932. No further action was taken by the court or
by either party to the case until 1939, when a motion was made by
the plaintiff for judgment on the verdict. The defendant's contention
was, that the delay in applying for judgment was so unreasonable
that the right to judgment was barred. The court held that judgment
for the plaintiff was proper.
Where this question has been presented in other states the courts
have been unanimous in stating that mere delay in rendering judgment does not cause the court to lose jurisdiction, 2 despite the length
of the delay 3 or the fact that it is mandatory for the court, by statute,
4
to render judgment within a given time.
In an earlier Illinois case 5 wherein all the proceedings in a trial
up the entry of judgment had been regular, and a judgment had
been entered nunc pro tunc at a subsequent term, which entry was
erroneous because there was no evidence that any judgment had been
made by the trial court, it was decided that leave would still be
given, upon reversal on appeal, to move for the entry of the proper
judgment on the verdict. Likewise, a judge's authority to render judgment in vacation is not limited to the vacation next succeeding the
term at which the cause was taken under advisement, but continues
from term to term. 6 So, too, it has been held proper for a judge to
pronounce a legal and final judgment one year after having made a
memorial in his minutes showing that he had intended to render
7
some sort of judgment but had not done so.
Therefore, it is not surprising to find the Illinois Supreme Court
deciding in the instant case that no loss of jurisdiction has occurred,
8
as the cause, being continued from term to term by statute, is to
be considered pending until judgment is actually rendered on the
verdict.
J. R. ScoTT
1 374 Il. 57, 28 N.E. (2d) 107 (1940), reversing 303 Ill. App. 221, 24 N.E. (2d)
907 (1940).
2 State v. French, 100 Wash. 552, 171 P. 527 (1918); Moylan v. Moylan, 49 Wash.
341, 95 P. 271 (1908); Dusbabek v. Bowers, 173 Okla. 53, 43 P. (2d) 97 (1934).
3 Plumb v. Almekinder, 162 N.Y.S. 598 (1916) (judgment rendered sixteen years
after verdict); Puls v. New York, L. & W. R. Co., 104 N.Y.S. 374 (1907) (judgment rendered twenty years after verdict).
4 Bruegger v. Cartier, 20 N.D. 72, 126 N.W. 491 (1910) (even though a statute
provides for a compulsory decision within sixty days after a cause is submitted
to a court, the fact that judgment is rendered five years later does not render
the judgment void, nor has the court lost jurisdiction to enter the judgment);
Fisher v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 77 Ore. 529, 151 P. 735 (1915).
5 Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. Co. v. Wingler, 165 Ill. 634, 46 N.E. 712
(1897).
6 Friend v. Borrenpohl, 329 Ill. 528, 161 N.E. 110 (1928).
7 Siegle v. Mitchell, 249 Ill. App. 116 (1928).
8 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 37, § 72.24 provides: "All causes and proceedings
pending and undisposed of in any of said courts at the end of a term, shall stand
continued till the next term of court."
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LANDLORD AND TENANT---LIABILITY OF LESSEE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACTWHETHER CLAIMS FOR FUTURE DAMAGES FOR BREACH Or LEASE CONTRACT
MAY BE MADE AGAINST RECEIVER OF INSOLVENT BANK-In a recent Illinois

Supreme Court case,' the court decided that future damages accruing
under a lease, with twenty-eight years to run, were so uncertain and
speculative that the lessor could not maintain a claim against the receiver for such future damages, The lessee in this case was a bank
which ceased operations in 1931, and a receiver was appointed when the
lease still had thirty-three years to run. The lessor retook possession,
rented the premises for five years at a loss of $1054 per year. The
lessor then filed a claim with the receiver asking for $7,846 as rent
from the time of disaffirmance by the receiver up to 1936; and damages
of $28,458 for loss of rents during the remainder of the term estimated
on the same basis of a loss of $1054 per year.
In affirming 2 the Appellate Court as to that part of its decision
which declared the lessor's inability to file a claim for future damages,
the Supreme Court adopted the view followed by the majority of courts
in the country.
There are two classes of cases on the question of ability to file
claims against the receiver of an insolvent lessee for damages for rent
subsequently accruing on a lease. 3 In one class, the lease has contained
a provision for damages in the case of a breach of a covenant to pay
rent. In those cases it has been held that the lessor may recover for
damages subsequently accruing. Thus in Smith v. Goodman 4 the court
held that where a lessee makes a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors, any damages resulting to the lessor from the breach of covenants by the lessee will become a claim against the assignee which may
be proven against the estate the same as other claims.5 Because of the
way in which the courts have approached the problem both in receivership and in bankruptcy,6 it has become quite a common practice to incorporate into leases such a damage clause. Ordinarily, by such a
People v. West Town State Bank, 373 Ill. 106, 25 N.E. (2d) 509 (1940).
2 For a discussion of the principal case in the Appellate Court (which was
1

reversed on another point by the Supreme Court) see 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 289.

3 It is elementary that a receiver by virtue of his appointment, does not
necessarily become liable upon the covenants of a lease made prior to his
appointment by the party for whom he is receiver, but subject to the order of the
court, he has a right to timely elect whether he will adopt or reject the lease.
See: People v. Equitable Trust Co., 366 Ill. 465, 9 N.E. (2d) 234 (1937); Link
Belt Machinery Co. v. Hughes, 174 Ill. 155, 51 N.E. 179 (1898); Spencer v. Worlds
Columbian Exposition, 163 Ill. 117, 45 N.E. 250 (1896).
4 149 Ill. 75, 36 N.E. 621 (1893).

5 For other cases permitting claims versus the receiver for future rents when
a "damage clause" is inserted see Grommes v. St. Paul Trust Co., 147 Ill. 634,
35 N.E. 820 (1893); Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597, 38 S. Ct. 211, 62 L.
Ed. 497 (1917); Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603, 38 S. Ct. 214, 62 L. Ed.
505 (1917).

6 See Schwabaker and Weinstien, "Rent Claims in Bankruptcy," 33 Col. L. Rev.
213 (1933).
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clause the lessor reserves a right to enter upon default and terminate
the lease and the tenant in turn covenants to pay whatever damages the
lessor may sustain as a result of such termination. Even a claim for
liquidated damages provided for in such a clause is provable in the receivership proceedings provided that the amount is not so arbitrary as
7
to constitute a forfeiture or a penalty.
The principal case falls within the class of cases containing no damage clause. The principal reason for denying claims for future rents is
grounded in the history of our land law. In the early common law a
rent covenant did not give rise to a present obligation to render performance in the future. Furthermore, if the tenant failed to pay rent
when it accrued, his failure did not accelerate the rent in the absence of
a provision in the lease to that effect. 8 There was no doctrine in the
common law that a material breach of a lease would give rise to a
cause of action for breach of the entire lease, and there was no doctrine of anticipatory breach of a lease. 9 Notwithstanding these general
principles the courts have widely differed as to probability of future
rent claims against a receiver in cases where there have been no damage
clauses.
A number of cases allowing such claims are distinguishable on the
ground of actual or pending dissolution of the lessee corporation under
the rent contract. Thus, in the case of In re Mullings Clothing Company,'0 wherein dissolution proceedings were being held, the court allowed a recovery on the ground that to refuse would do injustice, since the
dissolution relieved the lessee of future liability," and if the lessor were
not permitted to prove his future claims he would be unjustly deprived
of his right to any recovery. Similarly a recovery was allowed in People
v. St. Nicholas Bank.12 By analogy, the same rule was applied where
the lessee had not yet been declared insolvent, but proceedings had been
begun by his creditors to marshal his insolvent assets. 13
On the other hand, the weight of authority is, in the absence of these
exceptional circumstances, that such claim is not allowed, following the
7 In re Cushman, 3 F. (2d) 449 (1924).
Leases sometimes contain a provision
for acceleration of the unpaid rent on default by the lessee. Ordinarily the lessor
cannot, in the absence of unusual circumstances, prove a claim on the covenant,
as such a claim would normally amount to the assertion of a penalty or a forfeiture. Kothe v. Taylor Trust, 280 U. S. 224, 50 S. Ct. 142, 74 L. Ed. 382 (1930).
8 McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N. Y. 400, 65 N.E. 208 (1902). Even under the
law of contracts there can be no material breach of a contract for the payment
of money in future installments, giving rise to a cause of action for breach of
the entire contract. See Williston, Contracts, III, § 1328.
9 Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Assn., 240 U. S. 581, 36 S. Ct. 412,
60 L. Ed. 811 (1916). See also, Williston, Contracts, III, §§ 1328, 1329.
10 252 F. 667, 41 A. B. R. 756 (1918).
11 In the absence of dissolution proceedings, if the receiver elects not to complete the contract, the lessee is still liable on the rent contract when the installments accrue.
12 151 N. Y. 592, 45 N.E. 1129 (1897), where there was a reletting for the remainder of the term with a definite ascertained loss.
is Minneapolis Baseball Co. v. City Bank, 74 Minn. 98, 76 N.W. 1024 (1898).
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rule as applied in the principal case. In a typical case 14 following the
general rule, the court said that the appointment of a receiver is not
such an anticipatory breach of a lease covenant to pay rent in the future
as will sustain a claim against the receiver either for damages unaccrued at the time of the appointment of the receiver, or for damages
for the expected failure of the lessee to pay such rents. This view has
been adopted by the courts quite generally in the absence of extraordinary factors causing them to adopt the more equitable view. 15 In
deciding the way it did, the Supreme Court had ample precedent. In a
recent Illinois Appellate Court case 16 the court followed this general
view and disallowed a claim for future rents as against the receiver
who elected not to continue with the contract.
It seems that the result reached by our Supreme Court is a proper
authoritative one. In recapitulation, it may be said that the overwhelming weight of authority favors the view that the lessor has no provable
claim against the estate of the lessee in the hands of the receiver,
either for the rent reserved in the lease for the balance of the term, or
for damags for breach of the balance-at least where the lease contains
no provisions for the recovery of liquidated damages either in a lump
sum, or otherwise, or where no dissolution proceedings have been begun,
so that equitable principles would require the allowance of such con-

tingent claim.

I.

BInuBAuM

MARRIAGE-EFFECT OF INFORMAL OR INVALID MARRIAG--DuTY TO SumPoRT
AFTER INVALID FOREIGN DIVORCE.-The application

ARISING FROM A MARRIAGE

of the doctrine of estoppel to situations involving foreign divorce decrees
has led in many instances to grotesque results. The recent New York
case of Krause v. Krause' is aptly illustrative. Bernard Krause and
his wife, domiciled in the state of New York, were married there in 1905.
In 1932, while retaining his residence in that state, Krause made a visit
to Reno, Nevada, where he invoked the jurisdiction of the courts of that
state and obtained a decree of divorce from his wife, who neither entered an appearance nor was personally served in that action, and who at
all times remained a resident of New York. Later, after returning to
New York, Krause married the present plaintiff and they had lived together as husband and wife for some six years when he deserted her.
The plaintiff then brought this action under a local statute, 2 praying for
a decree of separation and also for support. The defense interposed was
that, since the divorce obtained by the defendant in Nevada would not
14 Block v. Bell Furniture Co., 111 N. J. Eq. 551, 162 A. 414, 84 A. L. R. 885 (1932).
15 In re McAllister-Mohler Co., 46 F. (2d) 91 (1930), distinguishing Smith v.
Goodman, 149 Ill. 75, 36 N.E. 621 (1893); Empire Distilling Co. v. McNulta, 77 F.
700 (1897) (even though lessee was solvent); Cooper v. Casco Mercantile Trust
Co., 134 Me. 372, 186 A. 885 (1936).
16 Kroch v. B. G. Operating Co., 286 Ill. App. 301, 3 N.E. (2d) 285 (1936).
1 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E. (2d) 290 (1940).
2 (N.Y.) Civ. Prac. Act., Art. 69, § 1161 et seq.
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be recognized by the courts of New York, the first marriage of the defendant was still valid and existing, that consequently, the subsequent
marriage ceremony between the plaintiff and defendant did not result in
a valid marriage because the defendant lacked the capacity to marry,
and that hence no duty to support the plaintiff resulted.
Upon motion, this defense was stricken in the trial court as insufficient in law and this ruling was affirmed by the Appellate Division.8
The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. That court
pointed out that the Nevada divorce obtained by the defendant was
invalid and would not be recognized by the courts of New York, but then
said that the defendant could not set this up as a defense in the present
action for separate maintenance. At first glance these two statements
appear to be paradoxical and certainly the result obtained is at best
clumsy and impractical. 4 Here is the defendant, still legally married to
his first wife, who now has grounds for a divorce, and at the same
time he is required to support a woman who is not legally his wife,
a relationship to which he is bound but which she may repudiate at
any time. However, upon examining previously decided cases, it can be
seen that such result has been foreshadowed and it would seem to be
the only result which could be reached.
The legal effect of the so-called "migratory" divorce, where the
decree is obtained in the courts of a state which is the domicile of
neither party, has been passed upon many times and is well settled.5
Conceding then that the divorce obtained by the instant defendant was
of no effect, the problem then becomes one of the application of the
doctrine of estoppel or some form of quasi-estoppel.
Whether the validity of the foreign decree can be questioned, depends somewhat upon which person thereto invokes the problem and also
the time or manner in which the question is presented. The cases, gen3 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 237 (1939); permission to appeal granted, 11 N.Y.S. (2d) 254
(1939).
4 In Anonymous v. Anonymous, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 71 (1940), which was argued
three months after the instant decision, an attempt was made to stretch the
ruling and the reasons therefor even further. The respondent, while validly
married to another woman who was still living, represented himself to be free
to marry and went through a marriage ceremony with the petitioner. The action
was a petition for support in the Family Court Division of the Domestic Relations Court of City of New York. The Corporation Counsel on behalf of the
petitioner argued that the Krause case was sufficient authority upon which to
base an estoppel against the respondent on the ground of his fraudulent conduct.
However, the court felt that it, being a court of limited jurisdiction, could not
apply such equitable principles even if the Krause case went that far.
5 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas.
1 (1906); Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed. 794 (1901),
reversing 155 N.Y. 129, 49 N.E. 933, 40 L.R.A. 291 (1898); Andrews v. Andrews,
188 U. S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366 (1903); Lynde v. Lynde, 162 N.Y. 405, 56
N.E. 979, 48 L.R.A. 679 (1900); Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N.Y. 131, 188 N.E. 279
(1933); Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N.Y. 463, 173 N.E. 680 (1930); Glaser v. Glaser, 276
N.Y. 296, 12 N.E. (2d) 305 (1938); Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N.Y. 382, 165 N.E.
819 (1929).
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erally, fall into three major categories. The first involves the original
parties to the divorce whose legal status has not been changed thereby.
While the successful plaintiff who has voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction
of the foreign court will not ordinarily be permitted to impeach such
decree, 6 there are cases which allow such attack, rejecting any attempt
to apply the doctrine of estoppel.7 However, apparently feeling that a
stronger control over citizens to prevent resort to foreign courts is desirable, other courts have seized upon the idea of quasi-estoppel to deter
such action, especially so where property rights become involved. By
way of illustration is the case of Starbuck v. Starbuck,s where the wife
obtained a divorce in Massachusetts and later sued in New York to
recover dower in real estate acquired by her husband after the divorce.
The defendants who were minor children of the husband by a second
marriage set up the Massachusetts divorce as a bar to the action and
the wife contended that the divorce so obtained was invalid. It was held
that, although she could not avail herself of a void decree which she had
procured, she could not be heard to impeach that decree for this purpose. Even the unsuccessful defendant in the foreign divorce proceeding
may find himself likewise unable to challenge the validity thereof if by
subsequent conduct short of remarriage an estoppel could arise.9
The second group of cases involves litigation between the original
spouses where either one, or both, has, following such decree, proceeded
to remarry so that the rights of third persons have intervened.' 0 Estoppel has definitely been involved in these cases, whether the original
6 Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N.Y. 503, 66 N.E. 193, 93 Am. Rep. 631 (1903);
Matter of Morrison, 52 Hun 102, sub nom. In re Feyh's Estate, 5 N.Y.S. 90 (1889);
In re Swales' Estate, 70 N.Y.S. 220 (1901) affirmed in 172 N.Y. 651, 65 N.E. 1122
(1902); Kaufman v. Kaufman, 163 N.Y.S. 566 (1917); Felberbaum v. Felberbaum,
150 N.Y.S. 907 (1915); Guggenheim v. Wahl, 203 N.Y. 390, 96 N.E. 726, Ann. Cas.
1913 B 201 (1911); Van Blaricum v. Larson, 205 N.Y. 355, 98 N.E. 488, 41 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 219 (1912); Strauss v. Strauss, 122 App. Div. 729, 107 N.Y.S. 842 (1907);
Voke v. Platt, 96 N.Y.S. 725 (1905); Ellis v. White, 61 Iowa 644, 17 N.W. 28 (1883);
Miltimore v. Miltimore, 40 Pa. St. 151 (1861); Ferry v. Ferry, 9 Wash. 239,
37 P. 431 (1894); Simons v. Simons, 47 Mich. 253 (1881); Bledsoe v. Seaman, 77
Kan. 679, 95 P. 576 (1908); McGraw v. McGraw, 48 R.I. 426, 138 A. 188 (1927);
Ponce De Leon Fountain of Youth Co. v. Day, 90 Fla. 197, 105 So. 814 (1925);
Judson v. Judson, 171 Mich. 185, 137 N.W. 103 (1912).
7 Vose v. Vose, 280 N.Y. 799, 21 N.E. (2d) 616 (1939); Holmes v. Holmes, 4
Lans. (N.Y.) 388 (1871); Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N.Y. 157, 7 N.E. (2d) 26, 109
A.L.R. 1016 (1937), where the husband obtained a Nevada divorce and when the
wife later sued for separate maintenance, filed a cross-complaint for an absolute
divorce. The wife interposed the Nevada decree to estop the husband; held that
the husband was not estopped but that the New York court was free to determine
the entire matter.
8 173 N.Y. 503, 66 N.E. 193, 93 Am. Rep. 631 (1903); Voke v. Platt, 96 N.Y.S.
725 (1905); In re Swales' Estate, 70 N.Y.S. 220 (1901), affirmed in 172 N.Y. 651,
65 N.E. 1122 (1902); Felberbaum v. Felberbaum, supra, n, 6; Matter of Morrison,
supra, n. 6; Van Blaricum v. Larson, supra, n. 6; Gibson v. Gibson, 143 N.Y.S. 37
(1913); Bledsoe v. Seaman, supra, n. 6.
9 Kirrigan v. Kirrigan, 15 N.J. Eq. 146 (1862).
10 Bruguiere v. Bruguiere, 172 Cal. 199, 155 P. 988 (1916); Arthur v. Israel, 15
Colo. 147, 25 P. 81, 22 Am. St. Rep. 381, 10 L.R.A. 693 (1890); Mohler v. Shank, 93
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plaintiff sues the original defendant who has since remarried," or
12
The judicial
whether the original defendant brings the second suit.
13
attitude is well expressed in Simmonds v. Simmonds, where the court
says, "It would be difficult to conceive a greater injury than will be
done to the woman who is now living with the defendant as his wife, if
this action were allowed to be successful. Her past relations with him
would be stigmatized as immoral, and her future position would be
wholly at his mercy, as he would be free to again take her as his wife or
to cast her off. This is a case here it should be held that there is an
estoppel on both sides. The plaintiff procured the decree, and the defendant has acted upon it in the most important way possible. Neither
should now be permitted to bring into question the validity of the divorce
thus obtained and thus acted upon. To hold otherwise would be to inflict a shocking injustice and injury upon an innocent member of society
under guise of maintaining a principle necessary for the protection of
society and its members." It is this policy of protection for the third
person who enters the picture in reliance upon the apparent freedom of
the original parties to the divorce to remarry that underlies the consistent application of the doctrine termed "quasi-estoppel" to those cases
involving their interests.
The third class covers litigation between one of the original spouses
and an innocent second spouse. Where the third person, being sued for
divorce, interposes the earlier invalid decree defensively to prove that
the parties were not in fact married, the doctrine of estoppel has been
rejected. 14 This allows the innocent, injured party to repudiate the invalid marriage relationship. But this is not the rule where the third
15
person had actively participated in the procuring of the initial divorce.
When, however, the earlier decree is used by the procurer thereof, or
persons in privity, in an attempt to cut off property rights, 16 to bar
criminal prosecution for nonsupport, 17 or to defeat recovery for moneys
expended for support,' 8 the courts lean toward the use of estoppel. This
view has now been reinforced by the decision in the instant case. The
highest court of New York, by refusing aid to the procurer of a foreign
Iowa 273, 61 N.W. 981, 34 L.R.A. 161, 57 Am.
61 Minn. 154, 63 N.W. 484, 52 Am. St. Rep.
Pa. St. 292, 19 A. 82 (1890).
11 Lacey v. Lacey, 77 N.Y.S. 235 (1902);
639 (1912).
12 Kelsey v. Kelsey, 197 N.Y.S. 371 (1922),

St. Rep. 274 (1895); Marvin v. Foster,
586 (1895); Estate of Richardson, 132
Simmonds v. Simmonds, 138 N.Y.S.
affirmed in 237 N.Y. 521, 143 N.E. 726

(1923).

138 N.Y.S. 639 at 641 (1912).
Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N.Y. 131, 188 N.E. 279 (1933); Fischer v. Fischer,
254 N.Y. 463, 173 N.E. 680 (1930); McCall v. McCall, 228 N.Y.S. 347 (1928); Davis
v. Davis, 279 N.Y. 657, 18 N.E. (2d) 301 (1938).
15 Kaufman v. Kaufman, 163 N.Y.S. 566 (1917).
16 Hynes v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 273 N.Y. 612, 7 N.E. (2d) 719 (1937).
17 People ex rel. Shrady v. Shrady, 95 N.Y.S. 991 (1905).
Is Brown v. Brown, 272 N.Y.S. 877 (1934) affirmed in 266 N.Y. 532, 195 N.E.
186 (1935).
13
14
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divorce, enforces a responsibility for future support voluntarily, though
improperly, incurred, and warns that "marriage obligations shall not
be lightly undertaken and lightly discarded."
E. R. BERNSTEIN
Quo

WARRANTo---PARTIES

PLAINTIFF

OR

PETITIONERS-WHETHER

STATE'S

ATTORNEY IS PROPER PARTY TO PROCEED AGAINST INSURANCE CORPORATION TO
WHOM INSURANCE DIRECTOR HAS ISSUED CERTIFICATE TO Do BusINESS.The People of the State of Illinois on the relation of John W. Barber, by
the state's attorney of Sangamon County, in a recent case' filed their
complaint in quo warranto against the defendants, alleging that the defendants were transacting an insurance business in this state without
authority. The answer, among other defenses, set up an existing certificate of authority granted by the Insurance Director pursuant to law.
It alleged further that Section 201 of the Insurance Code, 2 which provides

that "no order, judgment or decree, restraining or interfering with the
prosecution of the business of any company . . . shall be made or
granted otherwise than on the petition of the Director, represented by
the attorney general," was controlling, and barred any one but the Director from maintaining the present suit.8 In affirming the lower court's

dismissal of the complaint the Appellate Court adopted the view that
Section 201 was controlling in the present case, and that suits in the
nature of quo warranto were within the purview of that section.

The

major part of the controversy in this case arises over the construction of
Section 201 of the Insurance Code, 4 and the decision of the court is
one of first impression.
In all cases construing similar statutory provisions of other jurisdictions, the courts have placed emphasis on the fact that it was the
main, if not the sole purpose, of the section to prevent harassing of companies chartered by the State with unnecessary and expensive litigation. 5 Courts have generally held that an adequate remedy is provided
1 People ex rel. Barber v. Hargreaves, 303 Ill. App. 387, 25 N.E. (2d) 416 (1940).
The defendants in the principal case were about 1900 individuals transacting an
insurance business in Illinois as an alien Lloyd's.
2 II.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 73, § 813.
3 On June 28, 1938, the court granted the Director of Insurance of this state,
the right to appear as amicus curiae, who presented an argument and resisted the
petition filed in this case and asked for its dismissal.
4 The section appears in Article XIII of the Code which deals with the rehabilitation, liquidation, and dissolution of insurance companies, and is a continuation.
in substantially the same form of a section in the act of 1925. (Ill. Rev. Stat
1935, Ch. 73, § 502a-8a). This early provision was first considered in People ex
rel. Palmer v. Niehaus, 356 Ill. 104, 190 N.E. 349 (1934), where the court recognized that the purpose of the provision was to prevent delays and waste in
receivership cases, and held that its effect was to vest the administration of
insolvent companies in the Director. See also People v. Peoria Life Insurance
Co., 357 Ill. 486, 192 N.E. 420 (1934); Cook v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 46 F.
(2d) 782 (1931).
5 Swan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 155 N.Y. 9, 49 N.E. 258 at p. 262
(1898). See also Uhlman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 109 N.Y. 421, 17 N.E. 363
(1888).
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when such suit can be instituted by the Insurance Director, or other
person authorized by the local statute. 6
In determining whether sections, like our Section 201, are applicable
to quo warranto proceedings there is very little case authority or precedent. Some cases have held that a proper interpretation should necessarily include suits in the nature of quo warranto. In a late Kansas
case, 7 the court held that under a statutory provision,8 like our Section
201, the attorney general was not authorized to commence quo warranto
proceedings without the Insurance Commissioner's "recognition" to correct delinquencies of a life insurer in conducting its business. 9
Section 201 broadly includes orders, judgments or decrees enjoining
or interfering with the prosecution of the business of any company. In
Section 18710 defining the scope of Article XIII, under which Section 201
is also found, it is provided that that article shall apply to every company which is doing, or attempting to do, an insurance business in Illinois. It seems quite reasonable to assume that a judgment of ouster
by quo warranto would constitute such an "interference" as to be included within the prohibition of the quoted section. That a provision like
Section 201 is necessary is readily understood from an administrative
point of view. The state of Illinois has assumed a strong position with
respect to the regulation, control, and supervision of the business of
insurance. It has been long held that such business is affected with a
public interest and is a proper subject of legislation. Pursuant to this
policy, the State, by the passage of the Insurance Code, has placed the
control of such business in the hands of an executive officer in order
to protect the public interest, and he should have the authority properly
to perform his duties." This is not new, for under the Banking Act of
Illinois, the Auditor of Public Accounts has similar authority. 12 The
decision that Section 201 applies to situations other than actual liquida6 Under similar statutes, in other jurisdictions, it is generally held that stockholders in an insurance company cannot maintain suits asking for judgments
interfering with the corporate management of the company. Such suit can only
be maintained by the Insurance Director. See Lowery v. State Life Ins. Co., 153
Ind. 100, 54 N.E. 442 (1899) (suit to enjoin the issuance of certain policy contracts); McGarry v. Lentz, 13 F. (2d) 51 (1926) (suit to enjoin the purchase of a
lot and erection of a building); Swan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 155 N.Y.
9, 49 N.E. 258 (1898) (suit to compel establishment of reserve fund).
7 State v. Kansas Life Ins. Co., 140 Kan. 267, 36 P. (2d) 88 (1934).
8 Kansas Insurance Code R. S. Supp. (1931) § 40-222.
9 The court in the case recognized the distinction between suits begun by individuals and by the State and said that the fundamental question was not one
of determining capacity to sue, but of the supremacy of the Insurance Commissioner.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 73, § 799.
11 The authority of the Director and the limitations upon the power of the
courts to review his actions is discussed in People ex rel. Palmer v. Niehaus,
356 Ill. 104, 190 N.E. 349 (1934).
12 See People ex rel. Barrett v. Shurtleff, 353 Ill. 248, 187 N.E. 271 (1933),
wherein it was held that the court had no power to remove a receiver of a
closed bank who had been appointed by the Auditor of Public Accounts.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

tion seems to make the issuance of a certificate of authority conclusive
protection against quo warranto proceedings except at the instance of
the Director. As a practical matter it is doubtful, however, if the Director will ever challenge the issuance of his own certificate although
the Code gives him the power to revoke.
From an administrative point of view the result reached by the
court in construing Section 201 to include quo warranto proceedings is
a desirable one. The legislature has set up what it considers adequate
safeguards for the protection of the insuring public. To the Director of
Insurance has been committed the enforcement of these provisions. It
was the intention of the legislature, by vesting the Director with such
authority, that he should not be hampered in the proper exercise of his
duties. The question of who may institute proceedings to require affirmative action on the part of the Insurance Director is not within the
scope of this comment. It seems to be well recognized that any public
officer may be required to act affirmatively, in a proper case, through
mandamus. 1"
I. BIRNBAuM

TAxATioN-SHAmEs

IN FOREIGN

CoRPoRIioNs-TAxASInry

OF STOCK OF

FOREIGN CORPORATION HLD BY ILLINOIS OwNER.-In Hart v. Toman' the
Illinois Supreme Court sustained the contention of the Illinois owner of
shares of stock of a foreign corporation seeking an injunction to restrain the collection of taxes assessed on such shares of stock. The complainant contended that, because the tangible property of the corporation in Illinois had been assessed to the corporation, the proviso of subdivision 4 of Section 3 of the Revenue Act of 1872,2 as then in force, was
applicable, and the shares of stock should not be assessed or taxed to
the holder. Section 3 provides: "Personal property shall be valued as
follows: First: All personal property, except as herein otherwise directed, shall be valued at its fair cash value. .

.

. Fourth: The capital

stock of all companies and associations now or hereafter created under
the laws of this State . . . shall be so valued . . . as to ascertain and

determine respectively, the fair cash value of such capital stock, including the franchise, over and above the assessed value of the tangible
property of such company or association. .

.

.

Provided, that in all

cases where the tangible property or capital stock of any company or
association is assessed under this Act, the shares of capital stock of
such company or association shall not be assessed or taxed in this
state."
The court points out that the proviso to Section 3 relates to the
13

Hooper v. Snow, 326 Ill. 142, 157 N.E. 185 (1927); People v. Nelson, 346 Ill.

247, 178 N.E. 485 (1931); Michigan-Grand Bldg. Corp. v. Barrett, 350 nIl. 291,
183 N.E. 205 (1932).
1 373 Ill. 462, 26 N.E. (2d) 501 (1940).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 502.
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assessment of personal property as do Section 1 and Section 6,3 while
the balance of Section 3 relates to valuation for assessment purposes,
and reasons that the legislature did not intend to limit the proviso to
the preceding clause of subdivision 4. "The intention to make the proviso applicable to the capital stock or tangible property of any corporation, domestic or nonresident, which is assessed under the act is so
manifest as to need no further discussion."
While the court may have been influenced in its decision in the instant case by the fact that admittedly 97.7901 per cent of all the tangible property of the corporation 4 was located in Cook County and assessed there, it seems significant that the decision is not placed on that
basis.
After pointing out that, under the statute and the decisions, the
capital stock of a nonresident corporation cannot be assessed to the corporation in this state, 5 and that personal property of a nonresident corporation not in this state is not subject to taxation by the State, 6 the
court emphasizes that the language of the proviso is in the disjunctive.
"As to domestic corporations it was unnecessary that tangible personal property be mentioned in the proviso, because all the property of
a corporation is represented in its capital stock. . . The provision as to
capital stock applies to domestic corporations only, because the capital
stock of a nonresident corporation cannot be assessed in this State. This
leaves the provision as to tangible personal property applicable only to
3 The court cites Section 1 of the act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 499: "That
the property named in this section shall be assessed and taxed except so much
thereof as may be, in this act, exempted: First: All real and personal property
in this state. Second: All moneys, credits, bonds or stocks and other investments,
the shares of stock of incorporated companies and associations, and all other personal property . . .used, held, owned or controlled by persons residing in this
state. . . . Fourth: The capital stock of companies and associations incorporated
under the laws of this state." Section 6 of the act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120,
§ 534, is cited: "Personal property shall be listed in the manner following: (1)

Every person . . . shall list all his . . . bonds or stocks, shares of stock of joint-

stock or other companies (when the capital stock of such company is not assessed
in this State) . . . and other personal property."

4 While it is apparent that the ratio of the value of the tangible personal
property of a corporation to the value of its capital stock will vary with every
case, the amounts involved in two of the cases cited by the court in the instant
case may be of interest. In Porter v. Rockford, Rock Island & St. Louis Ralroad Co., 76 Ill. 561 (1875), the railroad property denominated "railroad track"
and "rolling stock" was assessed at the sum of $2,146,932 and the capital stock
at the sum of $1,004,480. In Ottawa Glass Co. v. McCaleb, 81 Ill. 556 (1876), the
tangible property of the corporation was assessed at $37,257 and its capital stock
at $61,420 additional. In the instant case the fact that 97.7901 per cent of all of
the tangible property of the corporation was assessed in Cook County does not
necessarily mean that 97.7901 per cent of the value of the shares in the hands of
the shareholders was assessed. For a discussion of the problems incident to
capital stock taxation see Oscar L. Altman, "Taxation of Intangibles in Chicago;
Administrative Substitutes for Statutory Change," 33 Ill. L. Rev. 635-642.
5 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lieb, 76 Ill. 172 (1875).
6 Maxwell v. People, 189 Ill.
546, 59 N.E. 1101 (1901); Dutton v. Board of
Review, 188 Ill.
386, 58 N.E. 953 (1900).
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nonresident corporations. The proviso does not refer to all the tangible
personal property of a corporation, wherever situated, but is expressly
which
confined to tangible personal property assessable under the act,
' 7
state.
this
in
is
as
property
personal
tangible
such
can be only
It appears from this decision that the owner of shares of stock of a
foreign corporation is exempt from taxation on such shares where the
corporation owns tangible personal property which is assessed and upon
which the corporation pays taxes in Illinois. It is to be presumed that
in application this exemption will be limited to those cases where the
property owned by the corporation and assessed in Illinois is owned and
used by the corporation for corporate purposes and not merely for the
8
purpose of avoiding a tax on the shares.
distinguishes cited cases 9 by
court
the
conclusion
In reaching its
pointing out that each of these cases involved the right to tax the
capital stock of a domestic corporation, and each was a suit by the corporation against taxing officials. None of these involved the right of a
stockholder in shares of a nonresident corporation to an exemption where
the tangible personal property of the corporation was assessed in this
state. There seems to be little question, however, that in considering
previous cases the court has thought of the proviso as exempting the
shares of stock of domestic corporations, a result justified by the provision for assessing the capital stock of domestic corporations.
In 1875, in deciding that the provision for valuing and assessing the
capital stock of an Illinois corporation was constitutional, the Supreme
Court indicated that the capital stock and other property of the corporation is a legal interest distinct from the shares of stock held by the
shareholders, and that a tax levied upon the property of one is not, in
7 The court seems to attach little significance to the fact that Section 6 of
the act requires that "every person . . .shall list . . .shares of stock . . . (when
the capital stock of such company is not assessed in this State.)" Italics supplied. Compare the significance attached by the Indiana court to somewhat
similar provisions in the Indiana statute in construing Section 8411: "Shares in
corporations all the property of which is taxable to the corporation itself, shall
not be assessed to the shareholders," was held applicable only to domestic corporations. Hasely v. Ensley, 40 Ind. App. 598, 82 N.E. 809 (1907). There is the
further consideration that the provisio which the Illinois court is interpreting
immediately follows the language, "The capital stock of all companies and associations created under the laws of this State . . . shall be so valued . . . as to
ascertain . . . the fair cash value of such capital stock, including the franchise,
over and above the assessed value of the tangible property of such company or
association." Italics supplied. It accordingly appears that the legislature might
have used the disjunctive "tangible property or capital stock" as applicable to
the possible situation where the capital stock might be determined to have no
fair cash value "over and above the assessed value of the tangible property of
such company."
8 See Commonwealth v. Muir, 170 Ky. 435, 186 S.W. 194 (1916).
9 Porter v. Rockford, Rock Island & St. Louis Railroad Co., 76 Ill. 561 (1875);
Ottawa Glass Co. v. McCaleb, 81 Ill. 556 (1876); Central Illinois Public Service
Co. v. Swartz, 284 Ill. 108, 119 N.E. 990 (1918); Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollak,
75 Ill. 292 (1874).
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But after inany legal sense, levied upon the property of the other.'
dicating that "practically, taxation upon everything, tangible and intangible, belonging to the corporation, is upon the same actual values
which the aggregate shares represent," the court said further, ". . . it is
sufficient that it is competent for the legislature to exempt shares of
stock from taxation where all the values they represent are taxed in the
hands of the corporation, and that such exemption is commended by
principles of justice and equality."
Again in People's Loan & Homestead Association v. Keith," the
court said, "Under Section 1 of Article 9 of the constitution, we think
it is plain that the burdens of taxation were intended to be cast equally
upon all the property of the state, of every description. Where revenue
is needed, a tax is required to be levied on a valuation so that every
person or corporation shall be required to pay a tax in proportion to the
value of his, her, or its property. Uniformity of taxation on all property, was the cardinal principle of that section of the constitution, and
had it not been for the adoption of Section 3 of Article 9 the legislature
would have had no power in any case to enact a law exempting any
property from taxation. . . . Shares of stock of homestead loan associations and notes taken by such associations do not fall within the property which the legislature was authorized to exempt from taxation, and
it seems plain that the section of the act is in conflict with the constitution." The court rejected an attempted analogy between the facts
of that case and the situation as to the stock of domestic corporations,
saying, "While it may be conceded that the interest of a corporation in
the corporate property and the interest of the stockholder in the corporation are separate interests, yet in reality they both represent one thingthe money invested in the corporation by those who organized and
created it . . . the legislature, under the power conferred by the constitution to regulate the manner of ascertaining the fair valuation of
property subject to taxation, and the mode to be adopted in the assessment, has provided by general law that the whole assessment shall be
made against the corporation. In doing this the legislature did not intend to exempt any property from taxation, and no property was exempted from taxation. The legislature, in order to avoid confusion and complication in the assessment, determined, as it had the right to do, that
the whole tax should be collected from the corporation itself. In adopting this mode of assessment, no property was exempted from taxation,
but the whole burden was cast on the corporation, leaving it to adjust
the matter between itself and its stockholders as it might think best."
In Greenleaf v. Board of Review 12 the court held that shares of
capital stock of a Kansas corporation, whose entire capital was invested
in Kansas, were taxable at the owner's residence in Illinois. The court
rejected the argument that since all of the property of the corporation

10 Porter v. Rockford, Rock Island & St. Louis Railroad Co., 76 IlI. 561 (1875).
11 153 Ill. 609, 39 N.E. 1072 (1894).
12 184 IMI.
226, 56 N.E. 295, 75 Am. St. Rep. 168 (1900).
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was taxed to the corporation in Kansas no tax should be assessed
against the holder of the shares of stock. The court pointed out that,
in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a share of stock is taxable to the owner, as other personal estate, at the place of his residence.
It is clear, therefore, from the decisions, that shares of stock are
property and, in the absence of statutes, may legally be taxed to the
owner even though all of the property of the corporation is also taxed
to the corporation. The Illinois court has consistently taken the practical view that taxing both is essentially double taxation, and has repeatedly indicated that where the domestic corporation is taxed on all of its
property there is not involved in any real sense the granting of an
exemption to the holders of the shares of domestic corporations in not
requiring them to list their shares for taxation. But the question may
be raised whether it can be argued with equal validity that there is no
exemption of property in Illinois from taxation if the owners of shares
of stock are to be regarded as exempt from taxation where a wholly
disproportionate value, having no relation to the value of the shares,
may be assessed against the corporation. Consider the possible case of
a foreign corporation whose shares of stock, aggregating in value a
million dollars, are all held and owned by Illinois residents, whose property is all outside of Illinois, except a small warehouse stock in Cook
County of an assesed valuation of two thousand dollars used as a bona
fide means of supplying rush order requirements of customers of the
corporation who are otherwise served from without the state. Apparently such a case is covered by the instant decision, and it will be
argued that there must be exemption of property from taxation in such
a case if the shares are not assessed to the owners, since shares which,
under the Greenleaf decision, would be assessed to their owners at a
million dollars if there were no corporate property in Illinois are to be
regarded as released from taxation because of the assessment to the
corporation of tangible property valued at only two thousand dollars.
Although this phase of the problem is not discussed by the court,
there is support in the decisions of other jurisdictions for the view that,
despite the possibility of wholly disproportionate values, this may be
regarded as a permissible determination by the legislature of the mode
to be adopted for the assessment and taxation of property rather than as
an exemption.
The Kentucky court in 1907, in considering the question of a stockholder's liability 13 on five hundred shares of stock of the Western Union
Telegraph Company, only about 1 per cent of whose property was situated and taxed in Kentucky, held that the exemption in Section 4088 of
the Kentucky statutes applied only to stockholders in corporations of
which all, or substantially all, of the property was situated in, and taxed
by Kentucky, and remarked that the legislative effort to exempt stock
from taxation, "if such an effort could be inferred from the statute," was
18 Commonwealth v. Walsh's Trustee, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 460, 106 S.W. 240 (1907).
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unconstitutional, as not being within exemptions specified in Section 170
of the Kentucky constitution. In 1909, however, this opinion was withdrawn, and another handed down, 14 in which the court said that the legislature having, and having exercised, the right to tax the property of
the corporation as an entity, instead of the individual interests of the
stockholders in that property, had exempted no property from taxation
within the meaning of Section 170 of the constitution. Subsequent litigation, 15 however, indicates that Kentucky has since provided by statute
for the limitation of the exemption of shares of stock of foreign corporations to those cases where 75 per cent or more of the property of
the foreign corporation is situated in, and taxed by, Kentucky.
Similarly a North Carolina statute of 191716 provided that stockholders of foreign corproations should not be required to pay taxes on the
stock "if two-thirds in value of its entire property is situated and taxed
in the state of North Carolina and the said corporation pays a franchise
tax on its entire issued and outstanding capital stock at the same rate
as paid by domestic corporations."
The Wisconsin court, in considering the question of stockholder's
liability, 17 had occasion to construe Section 1038 of the Wisconsin Statutes
1898, which reads: "The property in this section described in this state
from taxation, to wit: . . . (9) Stock in any corporation in this state
which is required to pay taxes upon its property in the same manner
as individuals." The court stated, "The fact that the property of a
foreign corporation is taxed outside of this state is not sufficient to exempt the shares," but held that a "foreign corporation having property
and agents and carrying on business in this state is 'in this state' within
the meaning of a statute classifying corporations for the purpose of
exempting from taxation their shares of stock."
The decision of the court in the instant case, and the somewhat related decision in the case of Wheelock, Lovejoy and Company v. Gill,'8
where the court held that there is no statute in Illinois authorizing the
assessment of intangibles or franchises of foreign corporations in Illinois,
seem to suggest the advisibility of legislative consideration of possible
statutory provision for (1) a franchise or capital stock tax on foreign corporations and (2) a limitation on the exemption of the shares of stock
of foreign corporations which have property taxed in Illinois.
As to the former, it seems clear that the legislature may by statute
validly equalize the tax burden of domestic as compared to foreign
corporations by imposing a franchise tax on foreign corporations doing
business in this state, measured by the value of their capital stock employed in Illinois, using a combined ratio based on wages paid, receipts
from sales, and tangible property in Illinois, as compared to the total
14 Commonwealth v. Walsh's Trustee, 133 Ky. 103, 117 S.W. 398 (1909).

15 Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19, 51 S. Ct. 15, 75 L. Ed. 140,
73 A.L.R. 679 (1930).
16 See Brown v. Jackson, 179 N.C. 363, 102 S.E. 739 (1920).
17 State v. Leuch, 156 Wis. 121, 144 N.W. 290 (1913).
18 366 Ill. 378, 9 N.E. (2d) 58 (1937).
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wages paid, total receipts from sales and total tangible property of the
corporation. 19 As to the latter, in view of the effect of the Greenleaf
decision, and in line with the general principle that all property in the
state shall bear its proportionate share of the tax burden, it would appear to be consistent for the legislature to limit by statute the exemption
granted to Illinois holders of shares of stock of foreign corporations,
the tangible property of which is assessed in this state, to those cases
where two-thirds, or 75 per cent, or even 90 per cent of the property
of the corporation is situated in and taxed by the state of Illinois.
H. M. BARoU

TRUSTS-SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS-RIGHT To ENFORCE PAYMENT OF ALIMONY AND MAINTENANCE OUT OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUST FUND.-In the recent
case of Schwager v. Schwager' which came before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiffs, a divorced
wife, suing in her own name and as the guardian of her minor children,
and a son of legal age, brought a bill to enforce the collection of an
Illinois support and maintenance decree from the principal or income of
a spendthrift trust. The spendthrift provision of the trust contained an
unequivocal statement that the divorced wife (the present plaintiff) of the
beneficiary should not partake of the benefits of the trust and certain bequests to the children were made contingent upon the giving up of all
claims against the beneficiary by their mother, the divorced wife. Named
as defendants were the husband, who had removed to Wisconsin to avoid
the effects of the Illinois decree, the trustees, and the contingent beneficiaries. The court dismissed the bill for failure to state facts sufficient to
constitute a valid cause of action, indicating that, since the courts of Wisconsin had not passed on this question, the court would follow the majority rule of other jurisdictions, keeping in mind the decisions of the
Wisconsin courts as to the inviolability of the right of free disposition of
property. The decision represents an extension of the law on this subject,
because it is the first case which has been presented in which a testator
has expressly prohibited the divorced wife of the chief beneficiary from
2
participation in the benefits of the trust. The plaintiff's case urged that
either the trust was void as against public policy, or if not, that proper
construction of the instrument would allow recovery.
Examination of the cases allowing recovery of support or alimony
payments from a spendthrift trust fund reveals that the courts have been
influenced largely by public policy considerations, but that they have
actually used a process of interpretation or construction in reaching the
19 See Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 336 Pa. 209, 8 A. (2d)
404 (1939).
1 109 F. (2d) 754 (1940).
2 The will stated, following the usual spendthrift provision, that the trustees,
on notice of an attempt to reach the beneficiary's interest, should withhold it and
apply it to his support and that of his dependents, "not, however, including his
first wife or any of his children by her."
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desired decision. Many have based the recovery for the plaintiffs on the
mere absence of an express provision to the contrary in the trust instrument.3 Others have found that the provision for support of the beneficiary
includes support of his family. 4 Still others have looked to the facts surrounding the execution of the will to cast light on the testator's unspoken
intention.5 In many cases the public policy ground has been employed
both as a rationale of the conclusions reached and as a means of remov6
ing alimony and support obligations from the class of ordinary debts.
Usually several of these reasons have been employed together. Text authorities have indicated a preference for those views which allow spends Tuttle v. Gunderson, 254 Ill. App. 552 (1929), where the decision turned largely
on the fact that the trust by its terms did not exclude from support the wife
and children of the cestui. The court there re-enunciated the suggestion made
in England v. England, 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922) (see infra, n. 5), that these were
incomplete spendthrift trusts in that not all classes of persons were excluded,
as contrasted with such trusts as that before the Pennsylvania court in Board of
Charities v. Lockard, 198 Pa. 572, 48 A. 496 (1901), where the trust instrument
provided: "All moneys or legacies herein bequeathed are to be paid to the
legatees in person, and to no one else, and shall not be assignable . . . for any
" (See also the Pennsylvania cases in n. 6.)
debts or obligations ..
4 Eaton v. Lovering, 81 N.H. 275, 125 A. 433 (1924) and Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N.H.
216, 132 A. 10 (1926), where the court found an intention to include support of
minor children but not alimony payments. See also Gardner v. O'Loughlin, 76
N.H. 493, 84 A. 935 (1912); Wetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N.Y. 520, 44 N.E. 169, 33
L.R.A. 708, 52 Am. St. Rep. 752 (1896), where the construction was aided by a
statute allowing creditors to reach surplus of income. And see Fink v. Fink, 248
N.Y.S. 129 (1931), reaffirming the rule of the New York cases.
5 In England v. England, 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922), the court enforced payment of
alimony from the trust income, relying both on a presumption of intention and
on the public policy ground. The settlor, having indicated that he expected
the beneficiary ultimately to marry, was held to have contemplated that his
wife would be supported from the fund. (The court indicated that upon marriage
she acceded to an equitable interest in the fund.) The court stated that keeping
the husband out of jail was a proper expenditure under the spendthrift provision,
saying, "In this state alimony is not a debt. It is a social obligation as well as a
pecuniary liability; it is founded on public policy and is for the good of society."
6 In In re Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 A. 802, 52 A.L.R. 1259 (1927), in
addition to finding that there was no showing of an intention to exclude the wife,
the court very definitely included the policy ground as a basis for its decision,
saying that an opposite construction "would be to place it in direct antagonism
to every recognized claim of morality and to every purpose of public policy."
There is no language, however, to indicate that the public policy ground would
be sufficient to overcome such a clearly expressed intention as that in the
Lockard case (supra, n. 3). In Thomas v. Thomas, 112 Pa. Super. 578, 172 A. 36
(1934), the court, in following the Moorhead decision on a case with similar
fact situation, said, "(1) It was not the intent of the testatrix to bar the deserted
wife; (2) to do so would be contrary to public policy; and (3) the obligation of
a husband is not based upon any contractual relation; it is a fundamental duty."
In Stewart v. Stewart, 127 Pa. Super. 567, 193 A. 860 (1937), the court cited with
approval the language of Judge Gordon in Lippincott v. Lippincott, 28 Pa. Dist.
& Co. R. 28 (1936) who, after reviewing the Pennsylvania decisions stated, "The
foregoing decisions of our appellate courts have finally settled the modern law of
Pennsylvania upon the subject under consideration, and spendthrift trusts are
not definitely determined to be void and against public policy as to claims of
wives and children." This result is claimed to be independent of the Pennsyl-
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thrift trust funds to be reached for payment of alimony and support
7
claims.
Courts which have refused recovery in these situations have usually
been able to find an expressed intention to exclude petitioners and have
uniformly refused to vary from this discovered intention on any
ground of public policy.8 In those cases where the spendthrift provision
forbids only alienation of income for payment of "debts," the question as
to whether recovery should be allowed on the premise that alimony and
support obligations are not "debts" becomes crucially important. In at
least two leading cases the intention has been found to treat alimony and
support money as "debts" within the meaning of the spendthrift provisions. 9
In the instant case, because of the expressed prohibitions, there was
neither need nor place for interpretation. Therefore, for all practical
purposes, the question in the instant case is whether the court would implement the public-policy concept to void the spendthrift provision.
There are, because the courts have usually employed the device of finding an "intention," no decisions based directly upon the grounds of pubvania statute (48 P. S. § 136). And see Keller v. Keller, 284 Ill. App. 198, 1 N.E.
(2d) 775 (1936), where the court concluded its discussion by stating, at page
206, "We hold that because the will creating this trust fund does not expressly
disclose an intention to the contrary, because the claim for support of children
is one which transcends any contractual obligation, and because of the recognition in our law of the unity of the family, the court did not err in subjecting
the income from this trust fund to the support of the minor children of the
beneficiary."
7 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 223; Restatement of the Law of Trusts (1935),
Vol. I, § 157; Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts, §§ 331-340.
8 Bucknam v. Bucknam, 294 Mass. 214, 200 N.E. 918 (1936), where the will
merely provided that the provisions made for the beneficiary should not be
subject to alienation or anticipation by him, claims for alimony and support
money were rejected, the court said, "To permit a wife to collect out of spendthrift trust funds any decree for alimony which she might obtain, with all its accumulations, would often deprive an improvident beneficiary of all the protection
which the testator intended to give him." The court here suggested that support
for dependent children might be granted in a proper proceeding, following Eaton
v. Eaton (supra, n. 4), but in Burrage v. Bucknam et al., 16 N.E. (2d) 705 (Mass.,
1938), the court refused to affirm this possibility, saying it failed to find anything
"to suggest that she [testatrix] intended to do his duty for him in her will."
9 In San Diego Trust and Savings Bank v. Heustis, 121 Cal. App. 675, 10 P. (2d)
158 (1932), the plaintiff wife, still married to the defendant beneficiary sought
a decree for payment of support from the trust funds. The court held that construction of the will showed an intent to exclude not only debts but specifically
rendered the income immune from any process of law or the courts. In Erickson
v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71, 266 N.W. 161 (1936), rehearing denied, 267 N.W. 426
(1936), noted in 34 Mich. L. Rev. 1269, actual intent was found from the fact that
the testator amended his will after the divorce of the beneficiary to the effect that
beneficiaries were to get no title until actual distribution. On the question of
whether alimony was a debt, the court found that the testator expressly intended
to include alimony and support, saying that if alimony was to be an exception
"it must be by some justifiable interpretation of the donor's language, by which
such implied exception may be fairly construed into the instrument of trust. It
cannot logically arise out of the character of the obligation."
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lic policy. The court here, not finding any Wisconsin cases, felt that it
should follow the few decisions to be found in other states. That it would
be preferable to exercise independent judgment was ably presented by
Judge Evans in his dissenting opinion.' 0
It is difficult not to believe that the court has sidestepped a major
problem in its decision. Indications that the modern trend is to restrict
the use of the spendthrift trust when it comes in conflict with the requirements of sound public policy are manifest in decisions and statutes today.
13
Kentucky, 14 and
Cases in Washington," Connecticut, 12 Rhode Island,
15
Oklahoma, show an adherence to the New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania decisions on cases involving this situation. Statutes have been
s
passed in Missouri, 16 Louisiana,' 7 and Pennsylvania' directly embodyYork by statute
New
here.
the
plaintiffs
for
by
contended
result
ing the
allows general creditors to reach the surplus of spendthrift funds, and
19
wives and dependents have been held to precede ordinary creditors.
Those instances in which recovery has been allowed include suit by
the state for support of the beneficiary, 20 by the federal government for
taxes, 21 by the alien property custodian where the beneficiary is an alien
enemy, 22 by an attorney for services rendered a beneficiary involving
24
the trust, 23 by a physician for medical services, by a creditor for nec26
25
by a trustee for advances, 27 and
by a creditor for a tort,
essaries,
10 "When Wisconsin courts have spoken, this court must and will accept and
apply its decisions as the controlling law of the case in that state. Until it has
finally announced its law, we are free to adopt that view which accords with our
ideas of right and justice. The argument in favor of holding the trust's exclusion
of wife's alimony and children's support money void, as against public policy,
in my opinion greatly outweighs the settlor's right to dispose of her property as
she sees fit, uninfluenced and uncontrolled by familial obligations. Entertaining
such views, I cannot, in the present state of Wisconsin law, give support to the
conclusion expressed in the majority opinion.
11 Knettle v. Knettle, 197 Wash. 225, 84 P. (2d) 996 (1938).
12 Bridgeport Trust Company v. Beach, 119 Conn. 131, 174 A. 308 (1934).
13 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Egan, 52 R.I. 384, 161 A. 124 (1932).
14 Ford v. Ford, 230 Ky. 56, 18 S.W. (2d) 859 (1929).
15 Frensley v. Frensley, 177 Okla. 221, 58 P. (2d) 307 (1936).
16 1 Mo. Stat. Ann., 1932, § 568, p. 349.
17 Acts 1938, § 81, par. 97, Darts 1939 Rev. La. Gen. Statutes.
18 Pa. Stat. (Purdon 1930), title 48, § 136; and see section 19 of the Wills Act,
Pa. Laws, 1917.
19 Wetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N.Y. 520, 44 N.E. 169 (1896).
20 In re Walters, 278 Pa. 421, 123 A. 408 (1924); Hohenshieldt's Estate, 105 Pa.
Super. 18, 159 A. 71 (1932); Town of Shrewsbury v. Bucklin, 105 Vt. 188, 163 A.
626 (1933).
21 In re Rosenberg Will, 269 N.Y. 247, 199 N.E. 206 (1935).
22 Kahn v. Garvin, 263 F. 909 (S.D.N.Y., 1929).
23 In re Williams, 187 N.Y. 286, 79 N.E. 1019 (1907); In re Ungrich, 201 N.Y. 415,
94 N.E. 999 (1911).
24 In re Berrien's Estate, 264 N.Y.S. 593 (1933).
25 Cooper v. Carter, 145 Mo. App. 387, 129 S.W. 224 (1910).
26 Kessner v. Phillips, 189 Mo. 515, 88 S.W. 66 (1905).
27 Clark v. Clark, 123 Kan. 646, 256 P. 1012 (1927); Equitable Trust Co. of New
York v. Miller, 185 N.Y.S. 661 (1920), 189 N.Y.S. 293 (1921).
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some others. In these cases the trust instruments contained no provisions forbidding the types of payments allowed. Consequently, although
public policy considerations are evident in the decisions, these courts did
not have to contend with an expressed intention of the testator, and they
decide merely between conflicting policies. Because the courts of Wisconsin have not yet spoken as to whether the policy favoring the power of
free disposition of property is strong enough to overcome a growing disfavor for spendthrift trusts, the court here did not feel free to determine
it. In taking this position, the court has left undecided the real question in
the case-whether the public interest requires overriding the testatrix'
expressed intention to deny participation in the estate to the divorced
wife of the beneficiary.
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CODE.-The case of Neirbo Company v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Limited' raises the problem of waiver by foreign corporations of
the venue privilege 2 conferred on them under Section 51 of the Judicial
Code. 3 The plaintiffs, residents of New Jersey, instituted suit in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York, against the United
Shipyards, Inc., a New York corporation, to restrain the sale of certain
property. The court refused to stay the sale; then the plaintiffs filed
an amended and supplemental bill alleging the consummation of the
sale. The plaintiffs in this bill added the defendant, Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd., as a party, process being served upon an
agent of the defendant, appointed in compliance with the conditions under which a foreign corporation is legally permitted to do business within
the state of New York. 4 The defendant appeared specially and moved to
quash the service contending it was a corporation created by the State
of Delaware, and that since neither it nor plaintiff was a resident of
the southern district of New York the venue was not proper according to
Section 51 of the Judicial Code. 5 The motion of the defendant was granted and an appeal was taken by the plaintiffs. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the ruling of the lower court. A
writ of certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court because of a conflict between the holdings of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit 7 and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.8 The
1 308 U.S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. (Adv.) 123 (1939).
2 Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U. S. 177, 49 S. Ct.
98, 73 L. Ed. 252 (1928).
3 28 U.S.C.A. § 112.
4 Cahill's Consol. Laws of New York, 1930, Ch. 24, § 210.
5 28 U.S.C.A. § 112.
6 307 U.S. 619, 59 S. Ct. 1037, 83 L. Ed. 1499 (1939).
7 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 103 F. (2d) 765 (1939).
8 Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 100 F. (2d) 770 (1939).
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Supreme Court held the venue was proper and that the defendant was
rightly before the court, because the defendant had waived the privilege
10
The court by this
conferred on it by Section 51 of the Judicial Code.
holding departs from the construction placed upon Section 51 in the case
v. Denton" and returns to the doctrine of
of Southern Pacific Company
12
Ex parte Schollenberger.
Section 51 of the Judicial Code was substantially unchanged from
1789 to 1887.13 In 1887 and 1936 the section was amended and the amend14
In 1878, when the
ment of 1887 is the controlling one in the instant case.
Schollenberger case was decided, Section 51 contained the following
provision, "No civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts
against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other
district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be
found at the time of serving such process or commencing such pro... 15 The court in that case held that while a foreign corceedings.
poration was not an inhabitant or a citizen of the district, it being for
jurisdictional purposes a citizen of the state that created it,16 the corporation had consented to be found and to be sued within the district, waiving
17
Compliance by the corporation with the
its objections to the venue.
8
conditions imposed by the state of Pennsylvania' was consent by the
to be found, it had
consented
it
had
express terms of the statute. Since
been found within the district, within the meaning of Section 51 of the
Judicial Code.
19
In 1887 Section 51 was amended and the words of the earlier act
"in which he shall be found," were omitted. The following language
was added: ". . . but where the jurisdiction is founded only on fact
that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be
brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the
21
defendant. ' 20 In 1891 Shaw v. Quincy Mining Company decided that a
Michigan corporation having a regular place of business in the state of
10 28 U.S.C.A. § 112.
11 146 U. S. 202, 13 S. Ct. 44, 36 L. Ed. 942 (1892).
12 96 U.S. 369, 24 L. Ed. 853 (1878).
13 Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. at L. 78, 79; act of March 3, 1875,
Ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. at L. 470.
14 § 51 of the Judicial Code, act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. at L. 552, Ch. 866,
as corrected by act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. at L. 433, Ch. 373; 49 Stat. at
L. 1213, 28 U.S.C.A. § 112.
15 18 Stat. at L. 470.
16 Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 11 L. Ed.
353 (1844), overruling Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 3 L. Ed.
38 (1809).
17 ". . . a defendant may consent to be sued anywhere he pleases, and certainly jurisdiction will not be ousted because he has consented." Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 at p. 378, 24 L. Ed. 853 at p. 855 (1878).
18 Laws of Penn., 1873, p. 27, § 13.
19 18 Stat. at L. 470.

28 U.S.C.A. § 112.
21 145 U. S. 444, 12 S. Ct. 935, 36 L. Ed. 768, sub nom. Ex parte Shaw (1891).
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New York could not be compelled to answer to a civil suit brought by a
nonresident of the state of New York in the federal courts located in the
state of New York. In this case the service was not made upon an
agent appointed in compliance with the conditions imposed upon a foreign corporation. In the case of Southern Pacific Company v. Denton,22
decided in 1892, the court held the act imposing the conditions under
which the agent was appointed unconstitutional. The statute in the Denton case, a Texas statute, required a foreign corporation to consent to
be sued and in addition required a forfeiture by the corporation of its
right to remove a cause to the federal courts. It was stated that compliance with valid conditions might have subjected the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of the federal courts "if Section 51 of the Judicial
Code allowed it to be sued in the district in which it was found." 23
The lower federal courts, 24 following the Denton case, held that a foreign
corporation, by complying with the conditions imposed upon it, did not
waive its right to object to the venue; that is, compliance with the conditions was not a waiver of the privilege conferred upon all defendants
under Section 51 of the Judicial Code.
However three cases, Shainwald v. Davids,25 Patten v. Dodge Manufacturing Corporation,26 and Oklahoma Packing Company v. Oklahoma
Gas & Electric Company27 held that the privilege had been waived.
The basis for the holding in the Davids case was that the doctrine of
Ex parte Schollenberger28 was not limited to consent to be found, but
the real proposition was that a foreign corporation by complying with
the conditions submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the courts sitting in
that state.
The result in Dodge Manufacturing Corporationv. Patten29 was based
on the analogy between the facts present there and the facts in United
146 U. S. 202, 13 S. Ct. 44, 36 L. Ed. 942 (1892).
"And it is established by the decisions of this court that, within the meaning
of this act, a corporation can not be considered a citizen, an inhabitant, or a
resident of a state in which it has not been incorporated; and, consequently, that
a corporation incorporated in a state of the Union cannot be compelled to answer
to a civil suit, at law or in equity, in a circuit court of the United States held in
another state, even if the corporation has a usual place of business in that state."
In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U.S. 221 at 229, 16 S.Ct. 273, 40 L. Ed. 402 at
405 (1895).
24 Platt v. Massachusetts Real-Estate Co., 103 F. 705 (1900); Hagstoz v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of New York, 179 F. 569 (1910); Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 287 F. 271 (1921); Jones v. Consolidated Wagon & Machine Co., 31 F.
(2d) 383 (1929); Thomas Kerfoot & Co. v. United Drug Co., 38 F. (2d) 671 (1930);
Standard Stoker Co., Inc. v. Lower, 46 F. (2d) 678 (1931); Mclean v. State of
Mississippi, 96 F. (2d) 741, 119 A.L.R. 670 (1938); Gray v. Reliance Life Ins. Co.
of Pittsburgh, 24 F. Supp. 144 (1938); Hamilton Watch Co. v. George W. Borg Co.,
27 F. Supp. 215 (1939); Toulmin v. James Mfg. Co., 27 F. Supp. 512 (1939).
25 69 F. 704 (1895).
26 In the district court, 23 F. (2d) 852 (1928), in the circuit court, 60 F. (2d) 676
(1932).
27 100 F. (2d) 770 (1938).
28 96 U.S. 369, 24 L. Ed. 853 (1878).
29 60 F. (2d) 676 (1932).
22
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States v. Southern Pacific Railway Company30 The United States in
this case sought to annul the lease or sale of certain property to the
Southern Pacific Company and the Western Union Telegraph Company.
The Southern Pacific Company objected to the venue, claiming it was
a citizen of the State of Kentucky, the state that created it, and not of
California where the suit was instituted. Mr. Justice Harlan, who heard
the case, 3 ' stated: "Those cases undoubtedly hold that a corporation
cannot throw off its allegiance or responsbility to the state which gave
it existence, and that its primary, legal domicile or habitation,-that is,
its citizenship,-is in such state; consequently, for the purpose of suing
and being sued in the courts of the United States, it is to be deemed a
citizen of the state by whose laws it was made an artificial person. But
neither those cases, nor any case in the Supreme Court of the United
States, directly decides that a corporation may not, in addition to its
primary, legal habitation or home in the state of its creation, acquire
a habitation in, or become an inhabitant of, another state, for purposes
of business, and of jurisdiction in personam." In the Southern Pacific
case the only connection the corporation had with the state of creation
was an office maintained by an assistant clerk for the purpose of preserving the charter. The connection with the state of creation, in the
Patten case, was an office maintained at the expense of $100 a year.
In the Patten case it was held that for all practical purposes the foreign
corporation was within the district in which it was sued.
It was held in Oklahoma Packing Company v. Oklahoma Gas and
Electric Company3 2 that a foreign corporation by qualifying to do business assents to all reasonable conditions imposed on it. Consent to be
sued is a reasonable condition, and thereby a foreign corporation expressly waives the privilege conferred on it by Section 51 of the Judicial
Code by qualifying to do business in a state other than the state of
creation.
The Supreme Court in the instant case, by holding the result reached
in the Davids, Patten, and Oklahoma Gas cases to be sound, makes
compliance by a foreign corporation with the conditions imposed upon
it, including consent to be sued, an automatic waiver of the privilege
conferred, by Section 51 of the Judicial Code. The effect of this is to
make a foreign corporation suable in the federal courts in any state in
which it consents to the service of process as well as in the state of creation, 33 other jurisdictional factors being present.
Mr. Justice Roberts, in a dissent 34 in which he is joined by the Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice McReynolds, questioned the wisdom of the ma30 49 F. 297 (1892).
31 Mr. Justice Harlan heard this case under a special commission issued by Mr.

Justice Field, pursuant to Section 617 of the Revised Statutes, and by consent
of the parties. 49 F. 297 (1892).
32 100 F. (2d) 770 (1938).
33 Dobie and Ladd, Cases on Federal Jurisdiction & Procedure (West Publishing Co., 1940), note on page 509.
34 84 L. Ed. (Adv.) 123 at p. 130 (1939).
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jority in making a change in the well-settled application of Section 51
of the Judicial Code. He expressed the view that since Congress is aware
of the construction placed upon the section by the court, any change
should be made by Congress. A further objection to the majority holding was that it allows a state, by its laws, to affect the venue of suits in
the federal courts. The venue of suits in the federal courts is a matter
solely within the control of Congress, and not within or subject to the
control of the states.
Will the automatic waiver of the privilege conferred by Section 51
of the Judicial Code work a hardship on foreign corporations? Is the
burden greater in defending a suit in the federal courts than it is in defending a suit in the state courts? 35 Is the burden greater in defending a
suit in a district in which the foreign corporation has consented to be
sued than it is in the district of residence of the plaintiff? 36 The answer
to these questions would seem to be in the negative. Foreign corporations were, and remain, suable in the state of creation, in the state
courts in any state in which they consent to be sued, and in the district
of residence of the plaintiff. Making them suable in the federal courts
sitting in the state in which they have consented to be sued, in addition
to the state courts, does not appear to be an additional burden.
Will a foreign corporation that has complied with the conditions be
held to have waived its objections to causes that arose in another state
as well as to causes that arose in the state in which it is sued? It appears
that the language of the statute imposing the conditions or the construction placed upon the statute by the state court will be controlling.
A holding by a state court that the statute applied to causes arising out of
the state as well as to those arising within the state has been approved
by the Supreme Court.37 The New York statute was held to apply to
causes arising without the state as well as to those arising within the
state. 38 However, the Supreme Court, in the absence of interpretation by
the state court, has refused to construe a statute so as to make it apply
to causes arising without the state, where no language compels such a
construction. 39 While there was no necessity in the instant case for a discussion of the extent of consent, the court might have given an indication
of what the holding might be if the issue is presented.
The court's reasoning in the instant case-that compliance with the
conditions imposed amounts to consent or a waiver-makes a foreign
35 A foreign corporation, in complying with the conditions under which it is
admitted to do business, may be required to consent to be sued in the state courts.
36 Assuming that service of process could be had on the defendant corporation,
according to Section 51 of the Judicial Code, it was suable in the district of
residence of the plaintiff.
37 Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling
Co., 243 U.S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1917).
38 Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 111 N.E.
1075, L.R.A. 1916F 407, Ann. Cas. 1918A 389 (1916); Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (1915).
39 Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Insurance Co., 279 U.S. 405, 49 S. Ct. 360, 73
L. Ed. 762 (1929).
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corporation that complies suable. It appears from this that a foreign
corporation doing business without complying with the conditions imposed is not suable,0 since there is no compliance upon which to base the
4
consent or waiver.
A realistic approach would have been to recognize the fact that
foreign corporations by merely doing business become a part of the business system of states other than the state of creation. Whether foreign
corporations do or do not comply with the conditions imposed, doing
business is, from a practical point of view, what makes them a part of
the business system and not compliance with the conditions imposed
upon them. The foreign corporation that becomes a part of such system by doing business should be suable in the same manner as domestic
corporations, that is, in the local courts, state and federal. This result
could be achieved consistently with Section 51 by holding that doing
business in the case of foreign corporations is the equivalent of becomR. F. RosE
ing an inhabitant in the case of individuals.
40 Cf. Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204, U.S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51
L. Ed. 345 (1907); Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59 L. Ed.

492 (1915).

